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LI SHARY 
PREFACE 
This study examines racial problems in Kenya during the colonial 
period. It does so by examining public documents and books that give an 
account of the racial problem. 
The author through the study came to the conclusion that the estab-
1 ishment of Kenya as a white colony brought with it racial discrimina-
tion, against the natives and Asians. That the colonial government 
through lack of definite policies aided the white settlers to perpetuate 
the condition. That the white settlers established and maintained racial 
discrimination with the idea of retaining their position of superiority. 
Racial discrimination was maintained by: taxes, labor, land, justice, 
education, residential and general welfare. That the natives through 
the provisions of the 'white paper' of 1923, which declared the inter-
ests of the natives paramount, got a chance to fight racial discrimina-
tion. 
The author wishes to express her deep appreciation to her major 
advisers, Dr. James Smallwood and Dr. George F. Jewberry, for several 
constructive suggestions, guidance and assistance in editing the manu-
script. Thanks are expressed also to the members of the_co1T1Tiittee, 
Dr. Michael Smith, Department of History; Dr. Carl Anderson, Department 
of Educational Administration and Higher Education, for their helpful 
critical comments on both style and content. Special thanks goes to 
the following typists, Debbie Miller, for typing the draft copy and to 
Brenda Morrison, for typing the final copy. 
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Finally, I express my warmest thanks and love to my husband, 
Henry, who read every word of the thesis and encouraged me. Thanks also 
go to my three children Caroline, Chemutai and Chepkurui who have 
been patient and understanding. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the night of December 12, 1963, Kenya achieved independence. 
Amid the smiles of black faces and the solemn looking faces of the 
Europeans and Asians, the Union Jack was lowered and the new Kenyan 
flag hoisted. With the shield and spears in the center, the Kenya 
flag has four colors (black, red, green, white). The black signifies 
the rule by the blacks; the red, the blook that was shed to win freedom; 
the green, the landscape; the white, agricultural products (mainly 
dairy). The spear and shield signifies the main weapons the black man 
used in Kenya to defend his country against white rule. 
What forces led to Kenyan independence? The answer to that ques-
tion provides the theme of this thesis. The establishment of Kenya 
by the British government had brought with it the establishment of 
racism. This policy rationalized by the belief that European dominarce 
was 11 for the good of the natives", a rationalization which the British 
representatives used while pursuing their own interests. Kenya was es-
tablished as the "white man's country 111 and racial lines were preserved. 
While the Europeans were the minority and the British spoke of equal 
rights, they simultaneously wanted to maintain their dominance. The 
purpose of this paper is to prove that the Europeans in Kenya estab-
1 ished and maintained racial discrimination to solidify their position 
of superiority. The British government aided the white settlers and 
officials by not having definite guidelines and by adopting a wavering 
policy for the colony. This policy led to friction between the Indian 
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and European races between 1918 and 1923. The British government in 
an attempt to settle the dispute, declared the native interests para-
mount by publishing the white paper of 19232• This was accidental and 
the white settlers would not tolerate this statement. They published 
their own white paper of 1927 stating clearly that the rights to be 
safeguarded were not those of the Afri~ans but those of the Europeans. 
It is the second major point of this thesis to prove that the paramount 
policy provided a chance to the Africans to fight racial discrimination. 
and brought the eventual downfall of the European supremacy and the es-
tablishment of a government for all. 
Kenya was not the first of the British colonies to experience 
racial discrimination. 3 The first British colonies in America and the 
West Indies had suffered from discrimination with th~ introduction of 
slaves. It is true that the British were not the first to deal with 
the African slaves, but when they did, they were leaders in the numbers 
they carried; moreover, the mistreatment these slaves received in the 
British colonies is amply documented. It is equally true that Britain 
was the first to advocate the abolition of slavery and the granting 
of equal rights to the ex-slaves, and the government paid slaveowners 
20,000,000 pounds sterling in compensation to avert rebellion in the 
West Indies. Until the establishment of Kenya, all racial or religious 
discriminations was expressly forbidden in many statements of imperial 
policy. During the time of the introduction of racial discrimination 
into East Africa, most of the older British colonies had eradiacted 
"t 4 1 • 
Britain believed in equal rights at home and advoc~ted equality 
abroad, racial discrimination was still introduced into East Africa in 
the 20th Century. When most Englishmen thought that the problem of 
slavery had been solved, a new kind of bondage was instituted in 
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Africa. The men who believed in and practiced the policy of inequality, 
discrimination because of race, still dominated one-half of British 
Africa. 
This study begins by examining the racial composition in Kenya 
at the outset of British colonialism. The two major races were the 
indeginous Africans which was the largest group and the immigrant groups 
consisting of Europeans, Indians and Arabs. Although the Indians and 
Arabs outnumbered the Europeans by a two to one majority, they did not 
receive equal treatment, as the study will show. 
The study further analyses the reasons in the establishment of 
racial discrimination. It is evident that the British government's 
policy, with its good intentions was never strictly applied. This 
accounted for many racial problems. This thesis will examine in detail 
how the natives were treated by the European settlers, the officials, 
and the other ilTIDligrant groups. It will show that the natives did not 
accept British rule completely without protest, as many have written. 
The last major section of the study deals with racial discrimin-
ation in other parts of Africa which were under the British rule. It 
will show that Kenya was not the first of the British colonies to 
suffer racial discrimination, but its pattern was similar to that of 
South Africa and Rhodesia. There are also differences in the East 
African countries Uganda and Tanzania. In other British colonies in 
Africa, such as in West Africa, (Nigeria, Chana) discrimination as it 
is understood by a Kenyan, Rhodesian, or South African was non-existent. 
This was due to the different policies followed in the West and East 
African countries. It will also be noted that social problems 
were greater in British Africa than in French, Portuguese, or 
Belgian Africa. 5 
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FOOTNOTES 
1E. Huxley, The White Man's Country (New York, Vol I, 1968), pp. 77-
85. 
2M. R. Dilley, The British Policy.:!..!!. Kenya (2nd ed. London, 1966), 
p. 57. 
3Norman Leys, A Last Chance.:!..!!. Kenya (London, 1931), pp. 127-128. 
4Ibid., p. 15, 18. 
5Ibid., p. 19. 
CHAPTER II 
KENYA AND ITS PEOPLE 
Kenya is an i1T111ense, sweeping country of plains and plateaus and 
mountains and desert. It sits astride the equator which cuts it in 
half east and west. The great Rift Valley divides it north to south. 
From the hot and steamy coastline on the Indian ocean, the land rises 
steadily through bush and desert for approximately 300 miles to the 
great plateau which at Nairobi is 5,500 feet. This plateau has the 
best agricultural land in the country which is about a fifth of the 
whole country. Several tribes were concentrated in the area which 
would later be known as the 11white highlands" for it was reserved for 
Anglos after the British took over the colony. The upper one-half 
of the country consists mainly of the desert. Wandering nomads from 
Sudan and Ethiopia at times occupy this sparsely populated area. 1 
Kenya borders Ethiopia and the Sudan to the north, Uganda and the 
great Lake Victoria to the west, Tanzania to the southwest, the Indian 
Ocean to the south-southeast, and Somalia to the east. The borders 
were arbitrarily imposed by the Europeans during the partition of 
Africa and divides many tribes. 
Africa was the last continent to fall under the European rule. 
This partially explains the scramble for ter~itory in Africa and the 
odd borders which disregarded the indegnious population distribution. 
There are many explanation given to explain the European takeover of 
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Africa from 1870 to 1900. The search for raw materials was a power-
ful motion for European expansion. The world balance of power is an-
other motivating buster, one which especially affected Kenya. ~ritain 
occupied Kenya to prevent the Germans from taking it. The political 
motive, in the eyes of some authorities, were the most important. 
Some assert that the partition of Africa came when there was no strong 
political or commercial movement in Britain in favour of occupying 
Africa. The other reasons put forward for the partitions are those 
relating to the need to safeguard strategic positions like Egypt and 
Uganda. The latter was especially important because of the Nile and 
Zanzibar on the Indian ocean. Stopping the slave trade was one of the 
weakest excuses for occupying a territory, but, like several other 
powers, Britain used it in East Africa as well as in West Africa. 
The above reasons explained the occupation of most of the African 
countries by the European powers, but not Kenya. Kenya was little 
more than a highway to Uganda. But, the British had to ensure that 
they controlled the source of the Nile, stop slavery inland, and make 
connections with Zanzibar on the Indian Ocean. To do all this Kenya 
had to be brought under British rule. 
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The British government cared less about the administration of 
Kenya after the partition of Africa. Its development was left to the 
Imperial British East Africa Company which found that ivory was of 
commerical benefit, but soon gave up the idea of exploring the resource 
because of lack of communication. The British government took over 
and built a railway line between Mombasa and Lake Victoria. The 
building of the railway was justified as ending the slave trade, 
but the real reason was commercial. The completion of the railway did 
not end the slave trade but was a success as an economic life-line 
and was vital later to the development of Kenya and Uganda. 2 
The building of the Kenya-Uganda railway, which sometimes has 
been said to have conquered Kenya, caused some resentment among the 
Africans. Force had to be used when the Africans opposed the march of 
the British. 3 This contradicts the belief that Africans offered no 
resistance and indicates that they wanted no part of British rule. It 
was the Arabs of the coast who were the first to experience the effect 
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of the new order. The Mazrui revolted rather than accept British rule. 
The Commissioner for the Protectorate, Sir Arthur Handinge was not re-
luctant to use force to demonstrate that there could be "no question 
as to our (the British) being the masters 11 • 4 With this kind of men-
tality, British rule was established in Kenya. 
The first of the indigenous people to be shown the effectiveness 
of modern rule when backed up by force of arms were the Masai. The 
Masai are a Nilo-Hamitic people. They are, by tradition, herdsmen, 
warriors, and hunters of the lion. They are excitable and full of 
nervous energy. Classically fierce and cruel they loved conflict and 
war before the arrival of the Europeans. For centuries they were the 
scourge of East Africa. They roamed the highlands and confined the 
Kikuyu, one of the largest tribes in Kenya to the Mt. Kenya region. 
The railway line to Uganda had to go through their territory. This 
could only be done by bringing them under control either by peaceful 
means or by force. At first the Masai saw no danger in the British 
railway line, since the British made no attempts to settle at that time 
and since they had no cattle, the object of Masai raids. The British 
on the other hand did not try to restrict Masai raids in other terri-
tories. The Masai were also having trouble with rinderpest, a cattle 
desease, and smallpox and so a mutual tolerance was created. However, 
an unfortunate incident which resulted in massacre of 650 Swahili and 
40 Masai made an Englishman kill 100 Masai with the help of three 
Frenchmen. 5 Good relations prevailed after that. 
Next to come under British control were the Taita of the hills. 
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After a show of force by the British, the Taita became the most obedi-
ent and peaceful tribe. The Kikuyu offered a little resistance, be-
cause they were generally not warlike and lived by cultivating the 
soil. The rest of the tribes -- Waiga, Ketosh, Elgumi, Kipsigis, 
Bureti, and Sotik -- had to be forced into accepting the British rule. 6 
The tribe most resistant to British rule was the Nandi, who lived be-
tween Lake Victoria and the Rift Valley. The tribe accepted alien 
rule and it was necessary for several fierce and bloody military 
campaigns to try and control them. The Nandi gave the protectorate 
government fierce resistance and were a threat as the new railway 
passed close to their territory. Some authorities believed that there 
was no resistance to the introduction of foreign rule in Kenya, but, 
as has been shown, this was not the case. 7 
After the completion of the Mombasa-Kisumu railway, the British 
found it unprofitable. They needed to make it pay.8 They had found 
that Kenya had no mineral resources and that the railway was a big 
burden for the new country to carry. The administrators had to find 
other ways to support the economy, and they decided to introduce a 
permanent white settlement. They had seen the fertile highlands as 
the railway progressed through Kenya and'decided that a quick remedy 
to Kenya's initial poverty appeared to be the agricultural colonization 
10 
of what they thought to be the empty but potentially productive lands. 9 
After the decision to colonize had been reached, British officials 
considered various plans. The first was to settle Zionists in the 
Uasin Guishu plateau.west of the Rift Valley. This scheme attracted 
considerable attention and controversy in Europe. It appeared to the 
British imperialist, Joseph Chamberlain, the promoter of the idea, 
to be a means of introducing capital to the protectorate and at the 
same time satisfying the demands of the Jews for a national home. But 
the area was not considered large enough to accomodate the Jews from 
the ghettoes of eastern Europe. The next scheme, if accepted, would 
have made Kenya "Brown Africa". Sir Harry Jonston, a British foreign 
officer, and a special commissioner for Uganda, believed that Uganda 
and Kenya were important to Britain only for their geographical posi-
tion at the source of the Nile. Europeans believed that whoever con-
trolled the Nile controlled Egypt, an important post on the way to 
India. Many British officials argued that if East Africa was being 
reserved by the British on the account of Indian Empire then it 
followed that East Africa was a suitable outlet for Indian trade, 
t . d . . t• 10 en erprise, an inmigra ion. 
The third, and most successful, scheme was that of white settlement 
d t bl . h t f A l S . . E t Af . ll an es a is men o an ng o- axon empire in as rica. This was 
achieved with the arrival of the first settlers from South Africa. 
This plan was conceived and implimented by Sir Charles Eliot, the pro-
tectorate co1T111issioner of Kenya from 1903 to 1904. He sent his chief 
of customs to South Africa to advertise the territory for European 
settlement. He was successful because of the interest shown by the 
Boers whose economy suffered from a depression following the Boer war. 
Shiploads of Boer farmers arrived in search of empty, untamed acres. 
Initially most of them settled outside Nairobi in the Kiambu district. 
This was an unplanned, hurried operation which caused an acrimonious 
land dispute between the British and the Kikuyu. The Boers later 
moved to Uasin Gishu Plateau where they formed an island of Afrikaaes 
in the heart of Kenya. Following the settlers from South Africa were 
settlers from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. 
ll 
Sir Charles Eliot is also credited with the reservation of the 
highlands for European use only. He was convinced that Kenya was a 
white man's country (an idea said to have been coined by Johnston) and 
that the land along and near the railway was suitable for European 
cultivation alone. The "white highlands", as it was later called, 
was that tract of the country almost without parallel in tropical 
Africa, a region of 12,000 square miles, admirably well-watered with 
fertile soil, cool and perfectly healthy climate covered with noble 
forests, and from which the brown man and later the African was kept 
away. 
The white highlands in a real sense belonged to several tribes. 
At the arrival of the British the indigenous population had been re-
duced by disease and epidemics in the 1890's. Most of the land set-
tled, the Kapiti plains south of Nairobi, Donya Sabuk on the borders 
of Ukambani, the central Rift Valley, the Mau, the Laikipia Plains 
between Mount Kenya and the Aberdares, and the Uasin Gishu plateau 
was formerly occupied, if somewhat sparsely and tenuously, by the 
Masai. There were other pockets of land, notably Kiambu in Kikuyuland 
and parts of Nandi and Lumbwa which were all alienated. Therefore 
almost all the people between Lake Victoria and the sea were able to 
point to some portion of their ancestral lands which had fallen under 
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European occupation. Agreements were made with the Masai in 1904 and 
with the others in 1913. The 1904 agreement gave them land in the 
Laikipia north of the railway line and another tract south of the 
railway. The Masai later disputed the 1904 agreement and the govern-
ment forced them in the 1913 agreement to surrender more land. The 
new agreement confined them to areas south of the railway close to the 
Tanzania border. This agreement gave them 15,000 square miles of land, 
about a one and one-half square miles per family, they were nomads and 
they needed more land. This allocation of land to the Masai compares 
to that given to the settlers such as Lord Delamere, the 11 father 11 of 
white settlement, who was given more than 100,000 acres, while South 
African and London-Johannesburg financiers were given more than 
300,000 acres of land east of the Rift Valley in an area where the 
Masai were concentrated. This set a precedent for disregarding 
African land rights whenever the need arose and for the demarcation of 
other tribal areas into reserves and in doing so created the white 
highlands reserved for exclusive European colonization. 
The Indian populace, although an immigrant one, had a long history 
in East Africa. They were a trading community in the early times, and 
Great Britain originally sent a consul there to protect her Indian 
subjects. But the great influx of Indians into the interior came with 
the British control and the need for labor on the Kenya-Uganda rail-
way. Thiry-five thousand Indians were given contracts since the 
British could not obtain enough labor locally. Some of these Indians 
went home when their contracts expired, but some stayed behind and 
became small merchants and traders. The Indian population continued to 
increase until it became the second largest, the Europeans thus became 
a minority. However, whites remained the dominant group. The African 
formed the lower unskilled laboring class, while the Indians formed 
the middle skilled class. The Europeans remained the masters. The 
three groups of people then provided the racial setting in East 
Africa, and the situation provided the breeding grounds of race dis-
crimination. 
13 
FOOTNOTES 
lFred Majdalaney, p. 3. 
2 Marshall f'1acPhee, Kenya (New York, 1968), p. 42. 
3 B. A. Oqot, Zaman (Nairobi, 196B), p. 249. 
4 Marshall MacPhee, p. 42. 
5Ibid., p. 44. 
6Ibid., p. 45. The na~es of the tribes given by the author namely 
Kipsigis, Sotick and Buret are one and the same people. Kipsigis is the 
name of the tribe and the other two names are the districts of the tribe. 
7Roland Oliver, History of East Africa (Oxford, 1963), pp. 42-43. 
8 Ogot, p. 258. 
9Later in dealinp with land question it will be found that the land 
was not really empty, but due to needs of the settlers the land seemed 
empty. MacPhee, pp. 47, 48, 50. 
10M. F. Hill, Permanent Way (East Africa, 19GO), p. 220. 
11 F. D. Luggard, The Rise of Our East African Er.rire (London, 1393). 
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CHAPTER III 
THE BASES OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
British policy for her colonies was as follows: 
There shall not be in the eye of the law any distinction 
or disqualification whatever, founded on mere distinction of 
color, origin, language, or creed, but the protection of the 
law, in a letter and in substance shall be extended impartially 
to all alike. 
In South Africa and East Africa, the government entrusted the 
fulfillment of this high imperial pledge to the resident European min-
orities. In Kenya the white minority entrusted with the above policy 
which placed the country upon a path that led to a racial war which was 
fought to restore the equal rights policy. 
The disregard of the policy of equal rights and the practice of 
racial discrimination took place without the sanction of Parliament. 
The British public was largely unaware of it. In the 1940s almost 
fifty years after taking over Kenya, the British were still talking 
of their empire as if it were based on free and equal opportunity for 
all. 2 What had thwarted the British policy in Kenya? The men who 
directly governed Kenya, like their counterparts in other British 
colonies in Africa refused to impliment the policy of equality. 
The change was gradual. The generation that had advocated 
equal rights died out and with them died the zeal to enfource equality. 
Moreover, the mood of the empire changed. The conception of what the 
empire meant was transformed until no longer was a colony thought to 
15 
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belong to its inhabitants. This change in both British public senti-
ment and official policy was shown by the Masai treaties made in 1906 
and 1912. In 1903 the government began giving away lands on the white 
highlands to Europeans so recklessly that by 1905 they left the Masai 
with little patches of land which they decided to make theirs forever 
by treaty. The treaty was made in 1906; then in 1911 the governor told 
the colonial office that the Masai wanted to leave the Laikipia which 
had the best soil, was a well-watered, and was an uninhabited area. 
What the governor did not say was that the uninhabited area had no 
water in the dry season. The colonial office agreed on condition that 
another treaty be made. The Masai were escorted out of the area by 
troops with rifles. Masai chiefs filed suit in the court of Mombasa, 
and when the secretary of state found out that he had been misinformed 
by local officials on whom British colonial policy rested, he ordered 
Laikipia to be given back to the Masai. The governor resigned. The 
secretary of state went out of office and his successor eventually gave 
Laikipia back to the settlers. The court decided that the 1906 treaty 
was not valid; but Britain made a new one in 1913. The governor who 
wanted to move the Masai out of Laikipia had been rapidly promoted for 
keeping the Masai quiet. One official ~ote to the governor protesting 
the removal of the tribe, but he never spoke to the Masai or wrote 
to them. But all the same, when the law suit was filed, he was ex-
pelled from Kenya for conspiring with the tribe. As a lesson to the 
rest of the officials on the continent, this man was left at the 
lowest rank until he was pensioned. 3 
,.:( 
In 1939 His Majesty signed two orders-in-council to deal with land 
in Kenya.· One proclaimed the exclusive ownership by Europeans forever 
of the so-called settled areas, including Laikipia. It said that in 
those areas 11all native rights whether such rights be tribal, group, 
or individual holdings in any land are hereby extinguished 11 • 4 The 
other dealt with "native lands". The governor was given the power, 
with the consultation of his board which had no African member, to 
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grant leases of such lands to Europeans. In short, Africans had no 
rights even to the so-called "native reserves", while the European had 
the right not only to the white highlands but also to any other desir-
able land. 
The British introduced taxation in Kenya to meet to cost of gov-
erning. They gave men work to do in making roads and building houses 
and stockades at two shillings and eight pennys a month; and at the 
same time the workers were taxed two shillings and eight pennys. This, 
however, did not provide money for salaries and imported goods so they 
decided to create that wealth by persuading owners of capital in Englarrl 
and South Africa to accept grants of land and to grow on it, by 
employing African laborers, produce for export and sale. The intruding 
Europeans were given unquestioning obedience almost everywhere, even 
when a poll tax was imposed, though it was regarded as enslavement. 
The taxation of the African male and the land question created a pat-
tern of society in Kenya during the colonial peridd. The society which 
I 
was created in Kenya was activated by endowing a/minority with all the 
privileges and advantages over a majority one. This was done first by 
the taxation already cited and land policies. Second, it was done by 
discouraging people from living and working at home. If they did, 
they would have to work for nothing for twenty-four days or more a year. 
The work which they did inside the reserve for free was paid for out-
18 
side the reserve out of general revenue, that in the main, they pro-
vided in taxation. lhis work was done whenever the district com-
missioner so decided and in most cases at inconvenient times. Some-
times the natives crops were lost. Third, the great bulk of experrliture 
on railways and roads were allocated to the districts where land be-
longed to the Europeans; Africans had to carry their produce to the 
market on their heads or backs. The markets, in most cases, were far 
and the crops permitted for cultivation were so bulky that their mar-
keting was impractiable. All departments, except those dealing with 
transport, spent at least four-fifths of their money in the European 
areas. The Europeans also had the advantages of superior education and 
wealth which enabled land owners to market their produce economically 
and introduce the Empire Marketing Board to advertise their produce 
abroad, while it was not done for the Africans. 
Fourth, veterinary regulations prohibited the export from the 
reserves of live animals for sale. The purpose was to check disease 
and was applied from time to time as need ~arose for the Europeans 
but on permanent basis for the Africans. The state-paid veterinary 
officers and other experts of the Agricultural Department were employed 
in the European areas. Fifth, the Africans were not allowed to grow 
cash crops such as coffee, tea, pyrethrum and sisal. In Tanzania they 
were allowed to do all this with the result that the value of native 
grown crops were greater than the total yield of the direct taxation 
of the Africans in that country. Lastly, forced labor and the making 
of the African into a wage earner was very important to the white 
society in Kenya. The governor and other government officials had to 
see that labor was supplied to the European settlers. Governor Sir 
E. Denham once said: 
11 There is the strongest moral obligation on the government 
of the country to give the full assistance it can in securing to 
the European settler in this country the benefits of the devel-
opment which he has created to the lasting advantage of the 
colony. I wish to make it perfectly clear that such is the pol-
icy of the Administration, and the Government expects every ad-
ministrative office to give all possible encouragement to the 
labor within their district to wgrk on the lands which have 
been opened up by the settlers. 11 
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These words were intended to result in compulsion. The government 
and the settlers worked on this for years and finally were able to ac-
hieve their goal, which was to employ as many laborers as they could 
at the wages they decided to give them. They wanted to force Africans 
to work for low wages which would be consumed by taxes to support a 
white minority. 
The Europeans wanted to control their own affairs and to dominate 
the Indian and native populations because they considered it their 
11 natural right 11 • They made sure that Kenya was not settled by the 
"lower classes" from the home country so they would not lower their 
standards. The men who settled in Kenya were mainly white public 
school men, younger sons, and refined army and navy people; it was their 
intention to uphold British standard. It was also expected in Kenya 
that men go out to make fortunes and then return to England to live at 
ease at home., To do this they had to control the government and manip-
ulate it in order to get rich quickly. This they accomplished with 
virtually free labor as they struggled to control the African workers. 
Both white settlers and regiment officials in Kenya had many priv-
ileges and.advantages, and in their view this was due to their superior 
attainments. They had an exclusive right the the franchise, superior 
rights in land holding, and advantages in every aspect of life. They 
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affirmed that they would be "swamped" if they had not kept these ad-
vantages or if they were extended to the Africans. What they meant 
was that if the same opportunities as they and their children had were 
extended to the Africans, their existing monopoly of high positions 
and large incomes and extensive estates would vanish. 
European superiority was based on the privileges already mentioned 
and African inferiority was due to lacking it. For the government to 
spend less than 5 shillings a year on an African child's education and 
more than fifty times that amount for a European child is to perpetuate 
inequality. As for the African inferiority, observers who have lived 
among Africans and understand their languages believe that they have 
the same natural capacities as themselves. 
One official told the colonial office that it was the duty of his 
government to teach Africans to be "good Africans" and not "bad 
Europeans~. He believed that the African should preserve his past.and 
not copy Europeans. Following such logic, the African would remain in 
an unskilled, ignorant class which paid the most taxes and got little 
in return •. To attempt to compel an African tribe to remain satisfied 
with what formerly satisfied them, was the fault of indirect rule. 
This ruling denies Africans the right to respond to new ideas, to 
adapt to modern conditions. In short, there was no evidence to show 
that an African was not capable of what other people could accomplish 
and that shows that European superiority was a cover for oppression. 
Discrimination did not stop with the Africans but extended to the 
Indians, too. As has been seen, the land that was reserved for 
Europeans excluded Indians as well as Africans. Major-General Sir 
Edward Northey, who became governor in 1919, told the Indians that 
"universal suffrage for the Asiatics in this protectorate on equality 
with the whites is out of the question 11 • 6 However, this position 
changed a little because the British was willing to listen to Kenya 
Indians after the World War I. India had contributed greatly to the 
war in Africa and Europe; Indians nationals had become conscious of 
their position and their potential power and used this in Kenya and 
tried to secure equal rights. 
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In Kenya the Indians did not want merely equal representation with 
the Europeans on the Legislative Council; they wanted the end of seg-
regation in townships, the right to hold land in the highlands, and 
promotion on merit, not race, to the highest posts in the police, 
army, and civil service. This was the core of the Indian question, 
a controversy which was to be the bane of Kenyan politics until the tirre 
when the. African people themselves began to voice their demands. The 
Europeans outnumbered as they were, proved too strong politically for 
their Indian adversaries. Paradoxically, this battle between the two 
immigrant races may have done more than anything to safeguard African 
interest. It provoked the British government to maintain, as a com-
promise and a way out of a difficult situation, that the interests 
of the African people were paramount in any conflict between the three 
races. So without the Indian question, Kenya might well have followed 
Rhodesia and become a self-governing colony ruled by a white minority. 
This does not mean that the African got what he deserved; he had been 
used by the two immigrant races to get out of a difficult situation. 
7 He was an outsider in his own country. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE GOVERNMENT AND DISCRIMINATION 
As was seen in the last chapter, it was the stated intention and 
policy of the British government to establish and maintain a colony 
that was based on equal rights for all. But the application of this 
policy was left to local officials to execute it at their own discre-
tion. In Kenya, Sir Charles Eliot introduced white settlement on the 
best lands on a racial basis. He intended to make Kenya a white man's 
country regardless of the numbers and interests of the natives. 1 It 
was Sir Charles who did not want the Masai to keep the good land along 
the railway line, because the Europeans wanted it. 2 He resigned in 
1904 because the foreign office questioned whether or not sufficient 
land had been retained for the Masai. 
There was no consistent native land policy in Kenya. The author-
ities adhered to the policy of providing sufficient land for native 
requirements, but interpretations of 11 sufficienci1 were vague and in-
consistent. The imperial government favored native reserves, but their 
size and boundaries were not fixed until 1926. Until that time the 
governor, with the consent of the secretary, could reduce or change 
them. The European settlers did not want definite reserve boundaries 
for two reasons: They would lose cheap labor, and they did not wish to 
limit their chance to expand by reserving land for the exclusive use 
of natives. It was a long time before they accepted reserves and only 
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then with the assurance that they could lease land if desired, with the 
permission of the governor. Five native reserves were established in 
1906: Kikuyu, Masai, Ulu, Kikumbuli and Kitui. Alienation of land 
included both the occupied and the unoccupied land. The 1924 Parlia-
mentary Commission reported that it doubted, for various reasons, that 
the Secretary had provided security for the natives. It was suggested 
in 1907 that since native unrest was due to apprehension over their 
land the reserves should be constituted as a trust to prevent further 
l . t. 3 a iena ion. 
such a plan. 
At that tim,e the British government refused to consider 
The result was the alienation of more than 11,000 square 
miles of the best land to the Europeans in the country which were later 
gazetted at 16,700 square miles (see Appendix A). The European pop-
ulation was approximately .07 percent of the population, with the re-
sult of overcrowding on the reserves of the two major tribes, the 
Kikuyu and the Kavirondo, where 107,155 people had only two acres a 
head. In the Dagorreti District, for example, the average was only 1.3 
acres a head4 (see the population map in Appendix B). 
The Crown Land Ordinance of 1915, by declaring native lands to be 
Crown lands, further increased the insecurity of the natives and 
created discontent. This ordinance empowered the governor to reserve 
any Crown land which in his opinion was required for use by the natives 
to support themselves and further allowed him if not satisfied with 
their use of it to cancel the reservation with the approval of the 
secretary of state. He was further empowered to take land from the re-
serves for public use such as roads, canals, and public buildings. 
If exclusion left the natives with an amount below that required, the 
governor could add an equivalent amount from Crown land. This ordin-
ance was interpreted to provide no legal right to land for natives, 
either individually or by tribe. Natives were held to be merely 
tenants, at the will of the Crown. Administratively, the law was in-
terpreted to mean that the natives could be dispossessed; part of the 
reservation could be cancelled by the governor with the approval of 
the secretary, if land was not used 11 beneficially 11 • There was no se-
curity for the native, and no European could have accepted land under 
such terms. It was doubtful if the Africans were even aware of it. 
The ordinance had provided for the natives to be notified by the 
Gazette. This was delayed for ten years for no apparent reasons, and 
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meanwhile encroachments were occurring on lands belonging to the Masai, 
Kikuyu, and Nandi peoples. The governor assured the settlers that no 
decision could be made without an opportunity for discussion. 5 
The Parliamentary Commission in 1924 had recommended the publica-
tion of the boundaries at once, hoping that this action would prevent 
the governor from alienating lands without the knowledge of the secre-
tary of state. The publication in 1926 did not change the 1915 ordin-
ance under which the natives were tenants-at-will of the Crown. The 
European settlers agreed to it on condition that land which was surplus 
then or in the near future should be available for leasing to non-
natives. They also were assured that the rest of the colony was avail-
able for white settlement. This was affirmed by Lord Passfield in the 
House of Lords when he said, 
11 I need hardly say that in settling the area of the reserves 
His Majesty's government never intended a division of land be-
tween blacks or whites. It has been repeatedly laid down that, 
excepting the Highlands, with regards to all the rest of Kenya 
outside the reserves tgere was to be no restrictions and no par-
tiality for any race. 11 
Since the Europeans had assumed that land outside the reserves was 
open for white settlement, they opposed any increase in the reserves• 
size. The settlers asked assurance from the governor that the re-
serves should not be increased without their knowledge. 
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The Parliamentary Commission in 1924, declared that natives would 
not be satisfied with anything less than a definite trust board in 
which their land would be vested; the board consisted of the governor, 
the chief Native Commissioner, three senior commissioners, two repre-
sentatives of the natives, and two representatives of the non-white un-
official s. They recommended that the powers of the governor be in-
creased by allowing him to acquire land after compensation had been 
paid. They farther recommended that continued alienation was not 
necessary and that leases should be granted that would allow the land 
to be part of the reserve. 
The Native Land Trust Bill was introduced in May of 1928, while 
the Hilton Young Commission was in Kenya invetigating the subject. 
Tpe Commission asked for the bill to be suspended until they made their 
reports, but unofficial opinion was in favor of the bill. The native 
representative on the Legislative Council, Canon Leakey, refused to 
vote for the bill because it did not safeguard the natives. Mr. Malik, 
an Indian representative, refused to vote for it, too, saying that the 
natives were not well represented on the board. The Hilton Young Com-
mission requested the bill to be sent to the British Parliament to-
gether with the Commission's report. The settlers were furious that 
the action was influenced by 11 busybodies 11 who supposedly had no know-
ledge of the subject. The House of Commons later objected to the lease 
arrangements except for brief periods, because it would further reduce 
the acreage of the reserve. 7 
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Colonel Wedgewood said that the bill would "still further enable 
the exploiters or settlers in Kenya to trech upon the already narrow 
native lands and to render the title not more secure, but less secure, 
than it is today". 8 Lack of native representation on the board and 
"beneficial occupation" as a test for leasing was questioned. Colonel 
Wedgewood indicated a preference for English rather than local legis-
lation. The bill was still under consideration when the labor gov-
ernment took office. Lord Passfield took immediate action and recom-
mended that (1) For land taken from a reserve for a public purpose, an 
area of equal extent and value should be added, except when the land 
was intended for roads or railways, or the site of a building; (2) fair 
compensation to cover all disturbances or losses incurred should be 
made to native affected by any exclusion of land from a reserve; (3) 
leases of land within reserves were to be limited to thiry-three years, 
save in exceptional cases, with the sanction of the secretary, leases 
not exceeding n~nety-nine years might be granted; (4) if a High Com-
missions should be appointed for East Africa, he should serl/c as pres-
ident of the central board in the place of the governor. 9 
The first of these amendments was immediately objected to by the 
elected members in a letter to the sectretary of state. The governor 
of Kenya, Sir Edward Grigg, agreed with them. The secretary insisted 
the the objectionable amendment stand. The unofficial protest was 
so violent that the governor adjourned the debate until the following 
session of the council. The governor again asked the secretary to 
leave it out, but he got the same answer. It was passed by the offi-
cial vote with elected members objecting to it violently in every way 
they could. 10 
The passage of the ordinance did not remove native fears, but 
their extreme anxiety was allayed. Several objections to the ordi-
nance included the failure to provide the machinery to enforce stated 
objects. The oroinance was also weak because the reserves were still 
crown lands. Two out of twenty-four sections of the ordinance dealt 
with securing land for the natives, but the rest of the sections spe-
cified how the native land, though reserved, could still be used by 
t . 11 non-na ives. Native security on land was based on an ordinance ap-
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proved by a body which could not be trusted to pass disinterested leg-
islation. For the purpose of the ordinance, the local government did 
not look upon the legislative council as an advisory body but as a 
deciding one. The very security of native land depended on the leasing 
privileges, which were closer to alienation than a temporary license 
to use another man's land. The leasing was provided not to protect the 
natives but to allow non-natives to exploit parts of the reserved 
areas without this feature, the Europeans would not have accepted the 
whole idea. 
Soon after the passage of the ordinance, gold was discovered in 
one of the most thickly populated areas of the Kavirondo district, 
and the ordinance was put to a test. Within a short time there were 
seventy-five prospectors; by the end of 1931 there were more than four 
hundred permits issued. By the end of the following year more than 
eight hundred Europeans were in the gold fields. 12 The area was thickly 
populated and was largely under cultivation. A meeting between a 
native commissioner and other officials was held with the gold pro-
spectors and the natives, and an attempt was made to explain to the 
natives that the mineral rights were reserved for the Crown; that point 
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had not appeared in the ordinance. Consequently, the natives mistrust 
of the government increased because they saw the futility of trusting 
a body in which they were not represented. A survey determined that 
the gold field was extensive, and this prompted the consideration of 
permanent arrangements for prospectors in the native area. The gold 
was in an area forty miles east to west and fourteen miles north to 
south, an area of about 420 square miles. Although it was thickly 
populated, the government alienated an area of 7,000 sqare miles to 
be divided into five sections. Two sections borders on the original 
gold field and the other was in the extreme south, along the Tanganyika 
border. The other three were to be prospected by companies, syndicates, 
or individuals under exclusive licenses. An amendmant to the ordinance 
was introduced in December of 1932 and was passed immediately. That 
the government was aware of the unpopularity of the amendment is seen 
by a speech given by the chief native commission: 
I am afraid that we have got to hurt their feelings, we have 
got to wound their susceptibilities and in some cases, I am afraid 
we may even have to violate some of their most cherished and sacred 
traditions if we have to move natives from the land on which ac-
cording to their own inalienable law they have the right to live, 
and settle them on l~nd from which the owner has indisputable 
right to eject them.13 
This action attracted more attention in England because it was be-
1 ieved to mean the breaking of the imperial pledge to the native popu-
lation of Kenya. The criticism of protest against the procedure was 
not confined to the 1 busybodies' as they were ca 11 ed by the set-
tlers, but to many people who were familiar with Kenyan and African 
matters. The press campaign against the action in January of 1933 was 
opened by Lord Luggard, who introduced the question in the House of 
Lords in February. He was supported in his protest by Sir Robert 
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Hamilton, Dr. Drummond Shiels, Professor Julian Huxley, Archdeacon 
Owen, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Sir Hurbert Samuel, Lord Passfield 
and the Marquess of Reading, among others. Their objection was that 
the action of the government in altering the provision that land com-
pensation should be given for land excluded from a reserve amounted to 
a repudiation of an imperial pledge and would cause more damage to 
native confidence than any amount of gold secured because of the 
change. Those who agreed with the government of Kenya, such as Sir 
Edward Grigg, held that the pledge in itself had been wrong, because 
it could not be maintained and should never have been passed. This 
is not surprising in view of his feelings when the original bill was 
passed, and this meant that in his view and those of the unofficial 
members, Lord Passfield was responsible for the government's failure 
to live up to its word. This was not true however, because at the 
time of its inclusion in the bill, the pledge was generally accepted as 
a just and wise measure, not different in principle from past policy. 
No important voice, either in or out of Parliament, was raised against 
it. It was accepted as a national, not as an individual or party, 
pledge. Besides, it was not fully accepted that under the new cir-
cumstances the pledge could not be fulfilled. It was felt that land 
was available, and it was suggested that land on the white settlements 
bordering the reserves should be bought for this purpose. 
The intention of the local government was to establish dispos-
sessed individuals on the land of their neighbors. The chief native 
commissioner had said that these neighbors had a right to eject the 
new arrivals, and opinion in England objected to a plan which might 
have such resuHs. Furthermore, such persons being tenants-at-will on 
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the land of others lost their status, and status was a matter of con-
siderable importance to the African. The local government thought that 
the natives would object, and that, therefore, they should not be 
consulted. 14 They vaguely hinted that after the report of the Carter 
Land Commission and the discussion of it, land as compensation for that 
which had been excluded might be given. 
It was no surprise that the local government put so much stress on 
the findings of the Carter Land Commission, because it worked within 
a limited and "colonial" frameword of ideas. 15 They felt bound to ac-
cept the status quo confronting them and were influenced by the set-
tlers' assumption that the large claims of the small number of existing 
European immigrants and of those who might possibly come in the future 
were of equal and, in some cases of more importance, than those of the 
three million native inhabitants who were already there and who had 
nowhere else to go. The Carter Land Commission was to consider the 
needs of the native population present and prospective with respect 
to land and the desirability and practicability of setting aside new 
areas of land for native communities. They were to consider native 
claims both to alienated and unalienated land. They were to define 
the European Highlands. The co1TV11ission outlined the Highlands on the 
most generous scale, not even reserving some important and fertile 
lands which had been taken from various tribes. There was so much 
alienated and unaccupied land on the European Highlands that large 
adjustments and exchanges could have been made. Instead the commis-
sion made practically no provision for land to be held for the Africans' 
future needs, although some tribes were known to be crowded. 
Two of the three commission members were settlers. 16 In their 
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findings they pointed out that the government did not adequately pro-
tect Africans from the encroachments of settlers. Nor did the govern-
ment explain to them the exclusive and permanent nature of European 
occupation. Rather, it encouraged white settlement when it did not 
have enough staff to deal with it. As a result, the Africans lost im-
portant areas of their land to Europeans, land that generally was fer-
tile and well-watered. 
The conmission recommended that the existing reserves, with such 
additions as it considered belonged to the natives, a total of 1474 
square miles, should cease to be crown lands and be declared native 
lands under the protection of the Native Lands Trust Board on terms 
secured by the order of the council (which had no native representative). 
The commission then allcoated 16,700 square miles to the settlers. In 
their fight to strengthen their position the settlers persuaded the 
government to remove the final check provided by the secretary of 
state's veto upon their power to refuse any concessions of land from 
the Highlands to the native areas. It would need an order-in-council 
to detach an acre from the Highlands, whereas on the other hand, 
Europeans, with the consent of the Trust Board, could lease native 
lands for thrity-three years or with the consent of the secretary of 
state for ninety-nine years. In either case it was unlikely that the 
natives would ever get the land back. 
The comnissioncriticized the native lands trust ordinance of 1932 
because it did not provide for the development of native lands. It 
then challenged the provisions of the ordinance, in which all manage-
ment, development, admistration and, control of native land was placed 
in the hands of the Central Board. The commission recommended that the 
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board should protect native land and that it should retain veto 
powers and the power to make representations to the government and to 
the secretary of state, to assure that the land was actually being de-
voted to the purposes for which it was assigned. The commission also 
recommended the establishment of an independent London Board, rather 
than local board composed largely of members who were also on the exec-
utive council. 
The British government accepted most of the work of the Carter 
Land Commission. The proposal for creation of the London Board was not 
accepted; a local Board was to continue. It was suggested that its per-
17 
sonnel would be altered, but the changes were never effected. 
Before the government of Kenya divided the land into white settle-
ments, reserves, and crown lands, they had introduced taxes. These 
taxes were discriminatory in the way they were levied and in their 
collection and in expenditure. The collections from the natives were 
used to support the administration in which the white settlers shared, 
for whom it was planned and toward which they did not pay their just 
share. In addition, taxes were arranged to provide labor to develop 
white estates. There was in Kenya a close relationship between wage 
earning and tax paying. Kenya's government used taxation to increase 
labor supply. Wages were, to a great extent, paid to the government 
in taxes which were used for the upkeep of an administrative machine 
largely for the benefit of Europeans. The question of taxation, of 
land, and of labor are inseparable. This was so because if the natives 
had enough land and were taught how to use it productively, then they 
would have enough money with which to pay the taxes and in that case 
would interfere with labor in the white settlement. And so the pro-
posal was made to reduce the amount of land held by the natives and 
at the same time increase the taxes so as to get them out of the 
crowded reserves to work for the white settlers. 
In Kenya direct taxation, a housing or 11 hut 11 tax, was introduced 
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as early as 1901. This tax was about two rupees. It was increased in 
1906-1907 tothree rupees and by 1915 to five rupees. Increases there-
after were applied by the governor's proclamation as he sawfit. 18 In 
1920 the chief native co1T111issioner introduced an ordinance in the leg-
islative council increasing the native tax to seven and one-half 
rupees. In addition, the poll tax, which was a tax on signle males, 
was increased to ten rupees. 
Direct taxation in Kenya was designed to be exacted from the 
poorest class, and indirect taxation was exacted not only on luxuries 
like whiskey and tobacco, but on necessities of life such as flour and 
clothing and was deliberately designed to add to the profits of a 
favored minority at the cost of the rest of the community. 19 
While the Europeans were to pay one direct tax, namely the poll 
tax, the Africans had to pay three direct taxes. One was paid by all 
and the others only by the peasantry. The largest taxes were the 
poll and hut taxes. By official figures the Africans paid twelve 
shillings, but in reality they paid twenty-eight shillings. The or-
dinary African in the village paid from one to five or more taxes. 20 
For example, if two men over sixteen lived in one hut, they would each 
have to pay tax. However, if there were four huts in a family, as is 
customary among the natives, the family had to pay hut tax for all 
four of them. 21 The fact is the tax fell on the man's dependents and 
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had to be paid by the person involved. So the tax liability did not 
rest with an African's wealth but with the number of dependents he had. 
The collection of these taxes was harsh. Hut counters would tour 
the villages and add new names to the lists of the previous year; 
no name was taken off since that would mean loss of revenue. People 
who had moved to plantations, who had gone to war, and those who had 
died were still on the lists, and their relatives had to pay their tax. 
A hut counter whose tally was high got early promotion while a man who 
granted exemptions to widows and the aged would either remain in the 
same status or in some instances would be transferred to the worst 
parts of the country or demoted. 
The second of the direct taxation of Africans was called the 
access or rate tax, which varied from tribe to tribe. It was levied 
by the Tribal Councils, on the same people who pay the hut and poll 
tax, except that those who had left the tribal area to work elsewhere 
for wages were exempt. Most of the money from this tax was spent on 
education and on roads. 
The third and the last of the direct taxation of Kenya Africans 
consisted of unpaid forced labor. Under the Native Authority Ordi-
nance, all adult males were commonly required to do six days' unpaid 
work every three months. 22 The penalty for refusing to work was a 
fine of up to 7 pounds, but in 1928 Sir Edward Grigg decided that a 
fine was not sufficient, and he decreed that a magistrate could add 
two months of imprisonment. This forced labor was used to get done 
for nothing the public works the government, not the tribes, wanted. 
It was mostly convenient for the government to get work done for noth-
ing. This forced labor was to be applied whenever and wherever the 
district officer saw the need. The natives were expected to repsond 
Without question. The only way one would excape this kind of tax, 
like any other tax, was through bribery, and since the headmen were 
poorly paid, it worked well for those who had money. Consequently, 
36 
the forced work had to be done by the poorest. This forced labor was 
only for the Africans in the reserves. The Europeans, Indians and the 
Africans who worked in the settlements in industries were not included. 23 
The injustice of forced labor acted as a double subsidy for the European 
settlement. It enabled the government to .spend practically all the 
money available for public works in the settled areas and to discourage 
to peasant cultivation. 
Thesettlers and the officials claimed that the heavy indirect tax-
ation that Europeans and Asians paid made up for the lack of any sub-
stantial direct taxation which was payed by them. High import duties 
meant little to the rich but bore heavilu on the poor, especially 
on those with dependents. The poorest people of all, the Africans, 
worried.little about indirect taxes because by the time they finished 
paying direct taxes they had little to spend on imported goods. The 
trade goods for African consumption, such as calico, cotton blankets 
and hoes, were charged railway freights four to ten times as much as 
the rates charged on plantation products for export. The Kenya-Uganda 
railway tariff heavily taxed not only luxuries but all the articles 
necessary to civilized life -- clothing, furniture, hardward, flour, 
and most foodstuffs. The discrimination in indirect tax came from the 
free list. This list included up to forty percent of total imports, 
but did not include things that are needed by the poor like, tined milk 
and calico. Instead, the free list was almost entirely composed of 
articles that only Europeans buy, especially those who had land, such 
as lorries, machinery, and fencing materials. Bicycles used by the 
peasants were taxed, while the European landowner 1 s tractor was ad-
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mitted duty free. Peasants crops were carried to the sea on the state · 
railway at a rate per ton three times as great as that charged on the 
tractor-grown wheat and maize. 
What was distrubing about the tax question was not who pays which 
tax, but whether the communities contributed according to their ability 
and received returns in proportion of their contributions. The Parlia-
mentary Commission of 1924 stated that both trade and non-native enter-
prise should in the future pay a larger direct contribution towards the 
revenue of the colony. In distribution of the revenue, the Africans 
who paid more than one-half did not get the services and this consti-
tuted a double loss for them. 24 
In 1924 the chief native commission said that 
It was strongly felt, both by natives and by administrative 
officers and others, tbat the present expenditure from general 
revenue on direct services to natives does not represent and ade-
quate return for the taxation they pay.25 
He was firmly convinced that an examination should be made of the 
taxes paid and the benefits derived, in view of the establishment of 
the local native councils and the immediate rating of the native com-
munities. He recommended that either a sum be returned to the local 
councils or part of the direct tax be retained locally at the time of 
collection. The Parliamentary Corm1ission, 1924 confirmed the Com-
rnissioner 1 s Statement of native distrust that their funds were being 
used to develop European areas. The Hilton Young Committee agreed that 
Central funds should be retunred to the local authorities. 
The governor in 1928 announced that all direct taxation was to be 
spent on native reserves and that the native contribution to general 
revenue would be provided from indirect taxation. This policy was 
adapted in the 1930 white paper, where it was stated, 
38 
that government expenditure on native services in the annual 
budget should bear a proper relation to the revenue raised from 
the natives, and particularly that the natives should receive, 
directly visibly, a fair retu~g for the direct taxation which 
they are called upon to pay. 
Lord Mayne in 1932 published a report on comparative taxation and 
expenditure and the separation of funds. In his report he condemned 
the existing system of native taxation and recommended that the hut 
and poll taxes be abolished because they were unsuitable for existing 
d •t• 27 con 1 ions. He advised a uniform adult male poll tax of six shillings 
to be collected by stamps on registration certificates. After that 
the hut tax would be from two shillings to fourteen depending on the 
wealth of the district. He also suggested a native livestock tax on 
wealth above a certain free allowance. The final development would be 
a native vultivation tax, instead of the hut tax, to be inaugurated in 
more advanced areas and to be adopted gradually throughout the reserves. 
He advised the establishment of the Native Betterment Fund to secure 
a guarantee that the natives would receive benefits according to the 
taxes they paid. 
Lord Mayne stated that the natives were taxes higher, individually 
and proportionally, than Europeans and that their returns were not ade-
wuate. The natives were overtaxed for the benefit of non-natives, 
chiefly for the Europeans. If the Europeans paid less in proportion 
and received more than the natives, surely they profitted at the expense 
of the larger group. Mayne's recorrmendation' that the non-natives should 
pay an income tax suggested that they were not paying their fair share. 
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Lord Moyne's report was discussed in the House of Common in July of 
1932. They thought that it was an extraordinarily fair, understanding, 
practical, and wise report, and all the more interesting because it 
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was so essentially unpretentious in its statement of the problem. 
Like the land and the tax question, labor was a constant rowe of 
friction between the governemtn and the natives, because it was used 
discriminately for the benefit of the minority group, the Europeans. 
In Kenya land was a most valuable asset and next to the possession of 
land, labor was the most important item. It was believe that the pos-
session of land without labor was of little value. The Europeans 
believed that they could not work in the tropics. 29 The development of 
the tropics then depended on the adequate supply of native labor, and 
many difficulties between the government and the settlers arose over 
native labor. The British government in practicing the principle of 
trusteeship, could not force the natives to work, but on the other hand 
the settlers believed that the British were responsible for their wel-
fare and should provide a sufficient labor supply, since the government 
had invited them into the country in the first place. 
Labor supply had its effect on theories of taxation and of land 
ownership. The settlers had advocated high taxes to force the native to 
work for wages to pay them. They also made sure the government col-
lected taxes on time to force Africans out to the settled areas during 
harvest time. They also wanted the government to limit the Africans 
reserves so the natives, not having enough land for profitable occupa-
tion would remain in settled areas permanently to provide labor. 
The labor question, perhaps more than any other, showed the 
British's indecisive policy in Kenya. The dispute showed the battle 
40 
between Britain's acclaimed policy of equality and the paramountry of 
the settlers. The settlers won most of the encounters as they did in 
everything else, rendering the British policy ridiculous and unworkable. 
As early as 1895 during the building of the Kenya-Uganda Railway 
labor problems surfaced. As was seen before, the government had to 
bring in Indians to work in the construction because the natives were 
either scarce or were unwilling to work for the strangers. The Land 
Committee in 1905 wanted the reserves limited so that any excess popu-
lation could overflow to meet labor demands. In 1905 the Colonists' 
Association took an interest in the labor supply and selected a com-
mittee to suggest desirable legislation to the government. Most whites 
believed that labor was adequate if it was made available and that the 
native land was to be arranged with reference to the labor supply. In 
1907 the government announced that the officers of the administration 
would do the best to supply labor for settlers, planters, contractors, 
and others. 30 
The settlers were against the regulations because they said that 
it made it difficult for them to secure labor and to use it. In 1908 
the Colonists' Association passed a resolution condmning government 
policy. They complained that the regulations had doubled the cost of 
labor without additional return and that the government had favored the 
natives in telling them that they did not have to work. The white 
settlers further believed that it was unfair to invite them into the 
country and then to restrict their labor force thereafter. Lord 
Dalamere spoke for the colonists and demanded the withdrawal of the 
regulations. The governor replied by saying that if it was the duty of 
the government ot supply labor, then it had a duty to see that it was 
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responsible for that labor. He wanted the Africans to work without 
compulsion and believed that the new regulations were just. 
Lord Dalamere felt that the natives had to be forced to work and 
wanted the government to force them. He also wanted waged lowered. 
The governor agreed to relax the regulations but not to withdraw. The 
settlers wanted direct action; one hundred of them marched to the gov-
ernment house and demanded the withdrawal of the regulations. A battle 
followed, 31 and the settlers demanded that the governor resign because 
they felt that he was not sympathetic with their plight. The governor 
kept his word and sent a dispatch to the secretary of state in April 
of 1908. The secretary decided that the government was to discontinue 
securing labor for the settlers. The white settlers were opposed to 
indentured labor because they felt that the colony was a white one and 
that if indentured labor, which would be mainly Indian, were imported 
then they would be repatriated after the completion of their contract. 
The committee on Indian Immigration did not recommend indentured 
laborers because of the settlers attitude and felt that the system 
would only work if indentured laborers were allowed to stay on if they 
wished. 
The settlers wanted to increase labor by increasing taxation and 
reducing the native land. This aroused concern in England where it was 
feared that a policy was about to be instituted which would virtually 
provide compulsory labor. The secretary of state said that the officials 
in the colony would not do anything that would suggest government com-
pulsion in the matter of recruitment, though it was hard to differen-
tiate between advice, persuasion, and compulsion. The European set-
tlers in Kenya were impatient with the government's indecision. The 
labor was available, but they could not get it. 
The secretary of state disagreed with the settlers' opinion that 
taxation was not connected with labor. He accepted the principle of 
native registration and believed the governemnt could encourage 
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natives to go out and work. The ordinance for registration of all male 
natives sixteen years of age and over was passed in 1915. This ordi-
nance was the key to providing labor supply for Kenya, and it through 
its operation that labor contracts were enforced. It was supported by 
the settlers becuase it gave them what they wanted but was very unpop-
ular among the natives. 32 The measure stipulated that every native 
who left his reserve and entered employment should carry with him a cer-
tificate of identification, which was achieved by fingerprinting. Apart 
from the native registration ordinance, the Resident Native Ordinance 
was passed in 1916 which regulated "squatting". This was to insure 
that men who left the reserves on the uncultivated parts of European 
farms did so under a regular contract. 33 The settlers did not favir 
it because they said it made it difficult for the natives to leave the 
reserves. 
A third ordinance was introduced upon the recommendation of the 
Labor Commission as an amendment passed in 1919 altering the masters 
and servants ordinance of 1910. The object of the bill was to provide 
medical inspection of labor prior to its engagment. It was also to 
provide for labor inspectors who would travel around the farms to make 
sure that good conditions were kept. The settlers opposed it, saying 
that it would add extra burdens to the employers; as an usual they got 
their way. 
The promise which the government had repeatedly put forward that 
they would not enforce the natives to work on European lands was 
broken in 1919. The governor, due to shortage of manpower, issued a 
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labor cicular. It stated that native labor was required for non-native 
farms and other developments and that it was the wish of the government 
that they should work. The governor thought that all officers were 
attempting to aid in developing the labor supply and believed that they 
agreed with him: 
that the larger and more continuous the flow of labor is from 
the reserves, the more satisfactory will be the relations as be-
tween the native pe~~le and the settlers and between the latter 
and the government. 
The government had broken its prmise that it would not supply labor. 
Instead, the officials were asked to exercise every possible lawful in-
fluence to get labor -- including women and children. All native 
chiefs and elders were asked to provide albor. The government would 
keep records of chiefs and elders who provided and those who did not 
provide natives for labor. The chiefs were to provide manpower for the 
government department from areas which were not providing labro for 
the plantation. The settlers had made Africans their slaves except in 
name. The settler demands for labor were extended in 1920 when the 
government introduced an amendment to the Native Authority Ordinance 
providing for compulsory requisition of paid native porters and other 
labor required by the government for a period of sixty days. The gov-
ernment was attempting indirectly to force men to work for the set-
tlers. This was done by excusing men from the above compulsory labor 
if they had worked for the settlers for three months the previous year 
or were fully emplyed by someone. The government also made sure that 
they paid lower wages than the settlers so people would work for the 
settlers instead. The ciruclar ended on a threatening note that if 
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these measures did not succeed, "other special measures" would be 
used. 35 This Ordinance was modified in 1921 after a long protest from 
the East African bishops and a long sustained resistance in England. 
The secretary of state under pressure from the settlers was slow to re-
spond and sent instructions that administrative officers were not to 
take part in the recruitment of the native. The bishops objected to 
compulsory labor. They objected to the use of chiefs to secure labor; 
to the idea that their success was to serve as a test of their effi-
ciency in office; and to the concept that children and women should be 
sent from the reserve. They also objected to the common belief that 
Africans not wo~king for white men were idle. Opponents of the cir-
cular claimed that is established a system of "veiled slavery 11 in a 
country where the government was pledged to secure the general welfare 
of the native population, that it seemed to say that colonial policy 
was designed to make the "nigger work", and that it showed that 
. 36 labor policy was too much influencial by the threats of 2,000 settlers. 
The governor announced that since there had been his understanding, 
there would be another circular. This was issued in July of 1920 and 
stated that officers should see that calls for labor were handled 
fairly and that there was no pressure brought on natives needed in the 
reserve. Children who worked had to be back at night, and women could 
remain if their husbands were employed and living on the farm. It was 
the duty of the officers to see that legislation protecting the native 
laborers was enforced. There were still doubts as to whether the policy 
had been changed sufficiently to avoid actual, though indirect, forced 
labor. The contention that a hint and an order were indistinguisable 
i 
to the natives was not considered by the government in adhering to the 
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policy of ''encouragement" and to the use of native authorities in de-
veloping labor supply. The secretary had specifically agreed to pro-
vide labor for the employing class, though denying that it should be 
done for individuals. This responsiblity of government to 'encourage' 
labor for the employers seemed to threaten forced labor for private 
profit. 
A memorandum submitted to the secretary early in 1921, by people 
prominent in public affairs in England, pointed out the danger of in-
direct complusion and suggested that it might be worse than a form of 
legalized conscription. It was stated thatthe government placed the 
officers in a difficult position and did not define the purpose exactly 
and that the natives should be encouraged to develop their own re-
serves. Since the employers were better able to present their own case, 
governments responsbility for the natives was increased. The natives 
chief could not distinguished between the reformed circular and the 
original. It was suggested that forced labor or encouragement should 
be abolished, whether it was for public or private purposes -- that 
officials should not mix their regular duties with that of paying to 
find labor. 
Secretary of State, Winston Churchill refused to send a Royal Com-
mission, except as the last resort. However, he instructed the gover-
nor that the machinery for compulsory paid labor would be maintained 
for public purposes~ To avoid misconception he stated that it was the 
declared policy to use compulsory labor only when absolutely necessary 
and could be authorized only by the secretary of state for specified 
work and for definite periods of time." The settlers objected to the 
requirement that the secretary's approval was necessary to call out 
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compulsory labor for public works. The ruling of the secretary that 
officials were no longer to participate actively in recruitment of 
labor but only to 11 encourage'1 was seen as the reversal of policy. The 
settlers were not satisfied with this policy but labor after 1922 be-
gan to improve, and officials were able to stick to the policy of 11 en-
couragement 11 • 
Sir Edward Grigg, when he was governor of Kenya had denied that 
there was any forced labor for private employers, but forced labor still 
occurred from time to time. The Nairobi Press in January of 1931 
reported a case in which a European farmer in the Songhor district was 
heavily fined for forcing labor and withholding wages. The farmer had 
sent one of his laboerers to the nearest European police post with the 
complaint that the laborer wanted to leave at the end of his contract 
and that the constable should induce him to stay. The constable 
threatened the worker with six months imprisonment, and to prove that 
threat was to be taken seriously, he ordered the man to break stones 
for a week without pay, after which time the man returned to work for 
the farmer. Some weeks later, this laborer, finding that some of his 
fellows were willing to take a risk went to the district officer, who 
returned them to the magistrate at Kisumu. The farmer was convicted, 
but the European constable who was as guilty as the farmer was not brought 
to trial nor demoted nor moved to another district. 37 
The above incident illustrated the way justice was carried out in 
Kenya. One result of the difference in status between people of dif-
ference racial origins was that the offenses of Europeans were punished 
far more lightly than those of Indi~ns and Africans. The Native Employ-
ment Ordinance stated the following: Contract of service means any con-
tract, whether by writing, or oral, whether expressed or implied, to 
employ or to serve as a servant, for a period of time. One section 
stated that whoever quits or induces any servant to quit the service 
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of his employer, or harbors any servants who may have quit, will be 
liable to a fine of five pounds and/or to imprisonment for a period for 
not to exceed six months. 38 The workers were then making eight shillings 
a month. One section allowed a child of nine to be a domestic servant. 
One stated that if a laborer refused to obey the commands of his master 
or any person placed in authority by his master, then he would be liable 
to a fine of five pounds and one month's imprisonment or both. If a 
herdman failed to report the death of an animal in his charge he would 
be liable to the above fine and imprisonment. This then explains why 
labor was a problem, although Africans did not have enough room in 
the reserve, they did not prefer to work for the settlers and probably 
end up in jail for minor mistakes. The settlers had to use forced 
labor to get them out of the reserves. 
The penalty for not paying hut and poll tax in Kenya was imprison-
ment for months. Sometimes the officials burned huts of those who 
failed to pay or seized animals if the man had any. The government made 
certain that arbitrary laws were obeyed by Africans and Asians. In 
one instance a thirteen-year-old boy took a joy-ride on a motorcycle 
which was not licensed. The boy was tried and convicted on three 
counts -- for not having a license, and for the motorcycle having no 
license and silencer. He was sentenced to four strokes with a cane on 
each count. The father pleaded for a fine instead, but the boy was given 
twelve strokes. If this had been a European boy the parents would have 
been warned, but the boy would not have been punished in that way. The 
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laws in Kenya were made and enforced along racial lines. The Europeans 
committed serious crimes, just as the Asians or Africans did, but did not 
get the same kind of punishment. 
The racial approach which we have noted in taxation, labor, and 
land was also applied to social services. Medical treatment, education, 
and other services were organized along racial lines, with the 
Europeans always getting the best services, Indians the second best, 
and the Africans having to do with whatever was left over. 39 
Education was first introduced to the natives through missionaries. 
While the government was busy forcing Africans to pay taxes and to work 
for the settlers, it did not spend money for their education or other 
needs. Instead, the government put most of the central revenue to 
work for the whiteman and his children. 
The government in Kenya did not establish education for African 
children until after World War I. Even then they went by the standards 
which missionaries had set. The mission schools cirriculum was lim-
ited -- natives learned elementray reading and writing but, it was 
better than nothing. The missionaries had three kinds of schools --
a sub-elementary, elementary, and primary -- and perhaps a tradeschool. 
A sub-elementary school was conducted in a village chapel where the 
children were taught to sing, read, write, and count. The cost of such 
a school was met out of mission funds, parent's fees, and local levies. 
Elementary schools offered five years of courses, with English being 
taught in the fifth and sixth year. In 1938 there were 57,000 children 
in elementary school and, of that a total of 5,002 were in government 
schools. The government charged tuition to African children but not to 
European. Approximately 9,000 African children in 1939 went beyond 
elementary to primary schools, which were mainly boarding schools 
belonging to the mission. There were four secondary schools which 
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were mission sponsored, too. There was no government African secondary 
school in Kenya at that time. 
The government in 1938 was spending 4 shillings and 3 pennys per 
African child of school age in Kenya and approximately 12 shillings for 
those registered. It was spending five pounds per Indian child and 
twenty-seven pounds and twelve shillings per European child. Twelve 
percent of the European pupils had free education, while 51.7 percent 
went partly free. The Europeans in Kenya not only excaped paying direct 
taxation, except for the drifting poll tax, but got most of the cost 
of their children's education paid for out of state funds. 
African parents on the other hand went to jail for a month if they 
could not pay their hut, poll, and state taxes while Europeans escaped 
paying althogether. If the Africans could not pay school fees in ad-
dition, their children were expelled from school. In other words the 
education of the richest people in the country was subsidized out of 
the taxes paid by the poorest, whose own children got no education at 
all. The worst race discrimination was shown in schools in Kenya where 
they had separate schools and cirriculum, not only for African, Indian 
and European children, but also for Arabs and Goans. 
The state government policy in Kenya was one thing while the 
practical policy was another; a minority made others servants first by 
taking their lands, taxing them, and making them work for low wages and 
then by not educating them so they would not be in a position to com-
pete with them. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCRIMINATION IN POLITICS 
The roots of all political controversies that raged in Kenya for 
more then half a century, as Marsahll MacPhee puts it, lay in the in-
struction given by the British Foreign office to Sir Donald Stewart 
when he succeeded Sir Charles Eliot as protectorate commission in 1904. 
Stewart was told, in writing, that it was only by a most careful in-
sistence on the protection of native rights that His Majesty's gov-
ernment could justify their presence in Africa. This clear indication 
of British policy was never published, and until the declaration twenty 
years later that Kenya was primarily African territory and that the 
interests of the Africans must be paramount, the settlers were led to 
believe that Eliot's view of Kenya as a white man's country where 
European interests were paramount was the official policy. 
Q 
European political activities began in 1903 and by 1905 were well 
organized by a group called the Colonists of Association. As the 
settlements grew in the white highlands so did many branch organizations. 
The settlers found it necessary to change the name to Convention of 
Associations, commonly known as the convention. Each local member of 
the convention sent delegates to the regular meetings held twice a 
year, and a permanent executive committee maintained continuity. Re-
solutions were drawn up by the member organizations to be presented 
to the convention; originally the resolutions adopted by the convention 
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were sent to the government as the representative opinion of the 
settlers. It was the custom of the governors to attend meetings to 
reply to the questions raised in the resolutions of a previous meeting 
or to send a written reply to the Executive Committee to be read at 
the opening session. Before the unofficial membership of the Legisla-
tive Council became elective in 1920, the convention was the only 
means of expressing European public opinion. 
The first meeting of the convention was held in 1911 and until the 
outbreak of the first world war the European settlers made all the 
political decision. By 1914 they had advanced their position under 
the influent .leadership of Lord Dalamere. They were on the verge of 
achieving their ambition of holding elections for the appointment of 
representatives to the legislative council, and they were well on 
the way to Dalamere's objective of ultimate self government for the 
white community and of Kenya itself. 1 At the outbreak of the war the 
convention lapsed and was revived in 1918. 
In 1917 Sir Charles Browning was acting governor, but the European 
convention decided that a governor selected from the ranks of the 
British colonial services was not the type of person who could deal 
with Kenya's post-war problems. They demanded and got from the 
British government a military governor, Major-General Sir Edward 
Northey, who had commanded the Rhodesia and Myasalan forces two years 
before the end of the war. 
To the Europeans Northey was a good choice, especially when in his 
first address to the legistature, he announced that two unofficial mem-
bers would be added to his executive council and that a bill to imple-
ment the grant of the franchise to Europeans would be introduced 
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immediately. Northey gave effect then to the British government formal 
recognition in 1916 for the settlers' claim to elect their own repre-
sentatives to the Legislature. The convention meeting to welcome 
Governor Northey wanted him to know the fo 11 owing: 
"They wanted the Governor's position strengthened against 
the colonial office; they wanted his position strengthened against 
local secretariat generally and against John Ainsworth, particu-
larly because his 'zoo theory' in native policy was not acceptable 
to most of the Europeans. They expected the new governor to end 
difficulties between officials and unofficials. They wanted it 
understood that they opposed increased taxation without repre-
sentation; that they wanted (1) a representative legislation 
council to which the executive council would be subordinate, 
(2) the convention, its meetings and its opinion to be taken seri-
ously (3) official support for increased white settlement and 
changes in land, (4) an extension of railways manned by Europe~ns 
and (5) the establishment of a system of native registration." 
Major Grogans views on the Asiatic question were clearly stated. 
He thought it most unlikely that British people would submit to the 
rule of an inferior people, for while there might be a few 11 decent 
and intelligent" individuals among Indians, there were no more. Indians 
had a right to do business in Kenya, but they had no right to control 
it; the empire owed it to South Africa to keep them out. The solution 
of the problem should be dictated from Africa not Downing Street. It 
was the settlers' warning to the governor that if he was in accord with 
them, they would show 11 unswerving devotion" to him, but if not, they 
would fight him. 
In 1920 eleven electoral areas were established and the official 
membership of the Legislative Council was increased to give the gov-
ernment a majority. The European population had been strengthened by 
a soldier settlement scheme and numbered 9,000 in 1920. With the elec-
tion of Europeans to the Legislative Council, the position of the con-
vention was altered from that of dealing directly with the government 
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to that of advising the elected members. 
The convention had been known as the 11 settlers parliament 11 , and 
as the 11 white parliament 11 had exerted an influence far beyond any other 
unofficial organization. · It provided a medium for the expression of 
opinion of the politically active section of the Europeans. Because 
of the effectiveness of their organization, the settlers widened their 
influence far beyond that which their numbers or constitutional po-
sition would lead one to expect. They adhered to the policy of agita-
tion accepted by the earliest colonist organization as the only method 
of accomplishing anything. They used the method of agitation in se-
curing elected Europeans for the legislative council. 
Nominated European officials constituted the majority on the com-
mittee appointed to consider details involved in the introduction of 
elective representation. It is not a wonder then that the following 
were drawn up and presented to the secretary of state: 
That there was to be no property or educational qualifica-
tions as the basis for the franchise, but that every adult male 
British subject, either by birth or naturalization, of European 
origin should be elgible, subject to proof of twelve motnhs' 
continuous residence in the country. European oriqin meant 
II s' 11 whole blooded descent from European ancestors. rnce the com-
mittee was of the opinion that at this stage of the protec-
torate's development when the colored races outnumber the white 
race it is not desirable that the franchise should be extended 
to Asiatics or natives. Indian interests were to be represented 
by two Indian members to be nominated by the governor, one to 
represent the lowlands, one the highlands. Arab interests to 
be represented by the Resident Magistrate at Mombasa and that 
Native interest should be represented by the chief native com-
missioner.3 
The settlers asserted their strength more in 1921 when they formed 
the Reform Party under Lord Dalamere. The object of the party was to 
secure for the Europeans community of Kenya the maximum power and au-
thority in the government under the Legislative Council Ordinance by 
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securing and selecting men agreeing on the need of consolidated action, 
stimulating public interest, promoting the endeavor to balance the 
budget by a reduction of expenditure rather than by an increase in 
taxation, preventing any decision without discussion, and affording the 
elected members and organization for the investigation and discussion 
of questions preliminary to the meeting of the Legislative Council. 
The Reform Party died in 1923, and the settlers entered at what is 
called Government in Association. 
The Europeans in Kenya had from the first looked forward to the 
time when they would have full self-government, or responsible govern-
ment. Always, even when they were urging a particular change, such as 
appointed officials on a legislative council in 1905 or elected repre-
sentatives in 1913, they insisted that they were asking for moderate 
change which in no way endangered the control of the colonial office 
over the other populations of the colony. But they had always had 
the ultimate goal in view. In the 1923 white paper the imperial govern-
ment made the following statement concerning the constitutional future 
of Kenya. 
It has been suggested that it might be possible for Kenya to 
advance in the near future on the lines of responsible self-
government, subject to the reservation of native affairs. There 
are, however, in the opinion of His Majesty's government, objec-
tions to the adoption in Kenya at this stage of such an arrange-
ment; and they are convinced that the existing system of government 
is in present circumstances best calculated to achieve the aims 
which they have in view, namely, the unfettered exercise of their 
trusteeship for the native races and the satisfaction of the 
legitimate aspiration of other communities resident in the colony. 
His Majesty's government could not but regard the grant 
of responsible self-government as out of the question within 
any period of time which need now be taken into consideration. 
Nor, indeed, would they contemplate yet the possibility of sub-
stituting an unofficial majority in the Council for the Govern-
ment official majority. Hasty action is to be strongly deprecated, 
and it will be necessary to see how matters developed especially 
in regard to African representation, before proposals for so much 
fundamental a change in the constitution for the colony can be 
entertained. Meanwhile, the admistration of the colony will 
follow the British traditions and principles which have been 
successful in the other colonies and progress towards self-
government must be left to take the lines which the passage 
of time and the growth of experience may indicated as being 
best for the country.4 
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Therefore the imperial government not only pushed the idea of self-
government into the background but ended for the time any hope of 
an unofficial majority on the Legislative Council. However, the state-
ment that the colony would follow the British traditions and that pro-
gress would be determined by developments, left the way open for 
presentation of other clains if conditions later seemed to justify it. 
When the idea of an East African Federation was put forward by 
the commercial communities in the East African territories, some 
Britishers who did business in these territories and in the settler can-
munity in Kenya were opposed to it because they thought that Kenya 
should stand alone for a while to realize its own ideals and progress. 
They could see the advantages of the union but thought that Kenya 
would lose more than it would gain. They had been fighting for two 
decades to consolidate their position, and they had made real progress 
toward self-government because of the concentration of the white popu-
lation and the small native population. Merging Kenya into a larger 
East Africa state would mean the swamping of the whites into a huge 
native state, and they doubted if they would ever be given control. 
The settlers' policy was that Kenya should stand alone until she had 
self-government and had solved her own problems. After that she would 
have no difficulty in absorbing other parts of British tropical 
Africa and ultimately in joining hands with South Africa. They favored 
close relations with the Union of South Africa, Rhodesia, Uganda, and 
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Tanganyika but not federation until the colony had been consulted. 
In 1927, however, the settlers changed their policy from that of re-
sisting the federation to that of having one, because the native policy 
in Tanganyika was not what they wanted. To stop its progress, then, 
the settlers hoped to use the federation. One other major point in the 
change of policy was that in 1927 the Conservative Party was in power 
and the settlers wanted things settled because they favored the Con-
servative Party, mistrusted the Liberal Party, and thoroughly disliked 
Labor governments~ because they disagreed with the Labor government's 
policies on local labor"isues, general native welfare, and Indian 
rights. Their condition of accepting the East African Federation was 
that the following safeguards would be provided: 
each state would remain a separate entity with its own consti-
tution and government; no hinderance would be placed on any one terri-
tory advancing toward self-government on constitutional lines; the 
finances of each territory should be controlled by its own legistature; 
the seat of the high commissioner for the territories must be in 
Nairobi; and a Kenya Protectorate should become an intergral part of 
the colony. They felt that Kenya had to be safeguarded in any such 
union. It was their intention that she would be the dominant member. 
They had struggled for a position of superiority in Kenya through safe-
guards and granting of privileges, and they wanted the same in the 
union. 
When the question of the union was introduced in the House of Lords 
in 1927, it was noted that forming a union using the guidelines of the 
settlers amounted to handing the colony over to the Europeans. The 
settlers wanted to secure the unofficial majority in the legislature so 
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that they could have a free hand in designing the East African Federa-
tion. As a result of the Eurpoean demand for more control in the gov-
ernment, the Hilton Young Commission was appointed. The objectives 
of the commission were: first, to maintain an effective imperial con-
trol, with co-operation of the local communities, over racial minor-
ities, native development, internationational obligations, uniformity, 
and continuity of policy in the empire as a whole; second, to provide 
a proper avenue for local initiative in government and to create a 
sense of security among the immigrant population. 
The Hilton Young Commission recommended close union of the East 
African territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. They found out 
that an economic unity rather than a political one was desirable since 
all communities, with exception of some in Tanganyika, were frightened 
of closer political union. The co11111ission also recommended an unoffi-
cial majority, after certainly prerequisites had been met, but not a 
European unofficial majority, either partly nominated and partly elected 
or entirely elected. The commission did not favor recognition of re-
sponsible government for the European minority. The Europeans regarded 
the report as critical of the entire policy of white settlement in 
East Africa, and they resented the implication that the white communities 
in East Africa could not be trusted in their dealings with natives and 
could not be treated in the same way as the white corrnnunities in other 
parts of the empire. In 1930 a joint committee was appointed to expand 
the Hilton Young Commission's findings. The committee heard fifty-
one witnesses, ranging from those holding positions of prominence in 
the administrations of East Africa to representatives of the native 
population. It was the first time that a native group aired their op-
inions without having to do it through a European representative. 
Kenyan natives did not favor the union, because they feared that the 
high commissioner -- advised by settlers and by governors advised by 
settlers, and even further removed from them than their existing gov-
ernment were would not make the 1930 white paper effective. The 
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natives believed that existing unsatisfactory conditions would be per-
petuated in a federation. The secretary of state officially accepted 
the joint committee's recommendation that there should be no change in 
the composition of the Legislative Council, other than that in the 
increased native representation. 
The policy of the paramountcy of European interests in Kenya as 
established by Sir Charles Eliot was pursued vigorously by the local 
government and the settlers as already noted. This had been done by 
the soldier settlement scheme, by the grant of the right of elective 
representation to Eurpoeans on the Legislative Council and by the 
nominated representation on the executive Council. It had been done 
also by the formation in 1923 of the Finance Comittee. The purpose of 
the committee, as the settlers saw it, was to insure that tax money was 
spent as the whites wished. 
The change in imperial policy which occurred in 1923, was largely 
the result of factors arising from the post-war period. The shifting 
from the paramountcy of white interests to that of the native was the 
result of the new realization and ideas of the contact of races. Sir 
Edward Grigg tried to explain the change in policy by saying that the 
war had brought with it the concept of protecting the weak people. 
That may be true, but the Indians, who had been told by Northey that 
European interests must be paramount, brought about the change through 
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objections and their desire to be equal with the Europeans. The in-
creasing degree of self-government for Europeans in Kenyan in 1919 
aroused the Indian issue which led to the famous statement of trustee-
ship in 1923. It is important to remember that the imperial govern-
ment's 1923 statement of its trusteeship, supposedly existing from the 
beginning of British rule in East Africa, came as the solution of a 
local quarrel between the Europeans and Indians. It was a way of 
solving a difficult question and not the result of any desire at the 
moment to insist on a change in the position of the natives. The state-
ment coming at the time when the mandate system, and including a con-
nection between the mandate of Tanganyika and the administration of 
Kenya, was accepted as the Magna Carta for the natives of Kenyaarising 
from the conscience of Great Britain. 
The discrimination against the Indians goes back as far as the 
establishment of white highlands from which the Indians were barred. 
Once the Europeans were secure in the Highlands, they objected to 
Indian landholding in any part of the country. The governor overrruled 
them, saying that there were many parts of the country outside the 
Highlands where Indians could hold land. The Europeans next wanted 
freedom in transferring holdings. The 1915 Land Ordinance provided 
that only transfers between races required the government's sanction, 
the governor to have a veto on such transactions. The restrictions 
on the holding of land by Indians were transferred from the adminis-
trative to the legislature by the provisions that leases for farms 
should be sold at auction. A notice stating whether anyone other than 
Europeans would be allowed to bid for the lease was required. These 
changes convinced the Indians that their position of inequality was per-
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manent. This together with the imposition of segregation in the town-
ships, supposedly on sanitary grounds, the establishment of elective 
representation for the Europeans on the Legislative Council, and the 
report of the Economic ColTITiission 1919, promoted a program of reform. 
The Indians did not particularly wish to live in the Highlands, but 
they resented racial discrimination and wished to share in the profits 
of land speculation. 6 
The economic report of 1919 brought to light the feelings of 
Europeans against the Indians and enlisted the government of India 
in support of the local Indians. The commission on supposedly native 
interests excluded the Indian fron Kenya on more, physical and economic 
grounds. It stated that imperial policy should take into account only 
the interests of the natives, Arab, and Europeans. 
The resolutions of the Imperial Conference definitely established 
the claims of Indian residents in Kenya. They recognized that there 
was an incongruity between the position of India as an equal member of 
the British Empire and the existence of disabilities upon British 
Indians lawfully domiciled in some other parts of the empire. The 
rights of such Indians to citizenship was recognized. 
The Indians asked the Imperial Government to instruct the local 
government to remove their inequalities and disabilities in accord with 
the resolution of the Imperial Conference. They also sent a delegation 
to India and asked them to make representation to the Imperial Govern-
ment through the secretary of state for India •.. They wanted equal 
elective representation with the European Community on the Legislative 
Council; a common electoral vote for the colony, including both 
Indians and European voters; the abolition of the reservation of the 
Highlands for Europeans; the withdrawal of the segregation policy 
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previously adopted for the towns; and the removal of other disabilities 
such as restriction on the use of railway couches, railway stations 
and public conveniences generally and discrimination against Indians 
in the civil service and professions. 
The Europeans in Kenya united to oppose the Indians in these 
demands because they said that Kenya was a white country, a population 
of 9,000 compared to the 22,000 Indians and three million Africans. 
They claimed that they were training Africans in the western ideals. 
The admission of Indians would be the government's failure of the 
British trusteeship. Whites feared that the great numbers of Indians 
would swamp them. They insisted on the policy of segregation so as not 
to endanger the health of Europeans. The convention also urged the re-
striction of Asiatic immigration. It opposed the granting of the 
franchise to Indians, the acquisition by Indians of land outside town-
ships and the employment of Indians in the government. The Governor 
Sir Edward Northey agreed with the convention. 
The Indians sent a delegation to the secretary of state. The 
group that the Indian coITDTiunity was being deprived of its elementary 
rights in an attempt to either drive them out of the country or to 
keep them in perpetual subjection to European settlers, holding greater 
capital investments, paying a larger proportion of the taxes, and 
providing skilled labor for the protectorate. The climate was more 
suited to Indians than to Europeans, and the laws, currency, and admin-
istration were based on those of India. 
The secretary did not grant them equality; restrictions on land 
were not removed to prevent discrimination against Europeans; segre-
gation was to continue; and administrative rulings with racial bias 
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were not altered. 7 This decision of the secretary was criticized in 
England, but Lord Milner defended his decision in the House of Lords 
He thought that Indians interests would best be served by nominated 
members, but if Indians insisted, he was willing to grant them a care-
fully considered franchise. The Indians were indignant; they would 
not consider any settlement not providing an equal franchise. They 
believed that their position was weaker than before the settlement, 
since the reservation of the Highlands was now accepted as government 
policy. They believed that the Europeans were not essential to the 
economic life of the community. If they were not prepared to accept 
equality, they should go home or elsewhere and make room in Kenya for 
others with less lofty ideas of their own superiority. They showed 
increasing dependence on the government of India which claimed that 
Kenya should be attached to India until such time as she was ready 
for self-government. 
The Indian government objected to the differences between Indian 
and European representation in a council with an official majority. 
They objected to Europeans having eleven members to voice their views, 
while the Indians were given two members. It was stated that India 
regarded the situation as one which would test the entire colonial 
empire, and India urged that a Royal Commission, with the Government 
of India represented, be appointed to study East Africa, particularly 
with the Indian question in mind. The Europeans were not satisfied 
with the solution because of the absence of restrictions on Indian 
i1JJT1igration, but they decided to refrain from expressions which would 
fan racial antagonism, holding themselves free to reopen the issue in 
the future. 
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In July of 1921, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian 
Affairs, under the chairmanship of Lord Islington, reported that they 
had considered the Milner dispatch and the reply of the government of 
India as well as evidence of witnesses. It recommended acceptance of 
the general principle laid down by the government of India that there 
was no justification for any inequality among British subjects. Thus 
they accepted the view of Indian government that Indians were not 
properly represented and that a reform of the franchise was necessary. 
They also suggested common roll, elimination of segregation through 
sanitation regulations had that the question of European ownership of 
the white highlands should be looked into more carefully. 
The Europeans in Kenya did not realize the extent of the feeling 
of Imperial Government toward some change in the status of the Indians 
until 1921, but from the report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, 
they saw great danger to their position. There were several mass 
meetings on both sides until the settlement in 1923. The settlers 
agreed that although Kenya was a British colony, the establishment of 
equality was impossible for it would mean the end of European set-
tlement. The European women feared the Asiatic menace and cabled the 
Queen to protect them, and the Indian women did the same. 
The leaders of the Europeans sent a delegation to South Africa 
to convince the government and the public of the common interests of 
the two countries and to enlist support against the Imperial Govern-
ment before Kenya was driven to adopt extreme measures. The South 
African policy and the attitude of the government of the union toward 
Indians at imperial conferences had led the Europeans to send the dele-
gation. The delegates prepared a highly colored view for South Africa 
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which represents the hysteria of the European community. They main-
tained that, since the Imperial Government seemed in danger of yielding 
to the plans of racial aggrandizement held by a section of the Kenya 
Indian Community, British communities in Africa should write to secure 
for Kenya application of the principle that every British community 
should decide its own composition. They insisted that Kenya was 
carrying on an unequal struggle against the organization, wealth, and 
influence of India, that granting Indian demands would mean the 
eventual withdrawal of Europeans, and that Kenya, once an Asiatic 
dependency, would, "by crafty exploitation and the great numbers at its 
disposal", extend its influence into the crippled territory of 
Tanganyika, Portuguese territory, Uganda, Nyasaland, and Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia, and finally into the Union of South Africa. In this 
way one-half of the continent of Africa might be lost to western civil-
ization if India should use her self-government as a means of severance 
from the British commonwealth, "the fate not only of Africa, but of 
the western world, may be jeopardized" in the coming war between the 
East and West. Europeans also tried to enlist the support of Nyasaland 
and Rhodesia. 
The settlers designed segregation on sanitary and moral grounds. 
To break it down, they feared, would mean the establishment of mixed 
schools "with the undesirable consequences of English children sitting 
beside Indian children 11 • The Indian desire to end segregation was 
based on principle and the Europeans would not take it. To permit 
Asiatics in the Highlands would amount to breaking of a "solemn 
pledge". They objected to Indians trying to stir up dissatisfaction 
among natives and to their false claims concerning their position to 
the natives. 
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The secretary of state opposed sending a royal commission to 
Kenya but announced that Indian policy was under consideration. In 
1922 the Secretary of State Chruchill announced that the government 
must consider the interests of Indians and should be careful to shape 
the laws so that they would not needlessly inflict any 11 invidious dis-
tinction11. He assured the Europeans that they would keep its pledge 
concerning the highlands and that the principle of equal rights on a 
basis was to be established in consultation with the interests of 
both Europeans and the natives. 
Once again the European settlers had their way. The policy in 
Kenya was still that of white superiority. The Indians protested that 
the announcement had been made without being consulted. Churchill 
claimed that the India office agreed with him, but indications were 
that this was not so. The resolutions aroused a storm of protest in 
India. A resolution of the Legislative Assembly stated that failure 
to meet lawful claims of Indians for equality with other Britich sub-
jects in African territory would be a serious violation of the rights 
of Indian citizenship. They regarded the speech as 11 indiscreet, un-
wise, reckless, and irresponsible 11 • They emphasized that Kenya was 
regarded as the test of imperial good faith. They hoped that the gov-
ernment would alter its decision. 
In 1922, the Under secretary of state for the colonies, Woods, 
stated that the proposal was unacceptable to both sides. He found 
that equal franchise was the most difficult aspect of the Indian 
' question, but he stated that the solution could be achieved with the 
full consent of the white community and that the Indians could partici-
pate 11 actively and effectively 11 in the government. In the solution 
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the Africans whose interests were sometimes overlooked would have to 
be included. The Europeans passed resolutions immediately, protesting 
any action the government might take to grant Indian claims. They 
threatened to use force if persuasive means did not work. They vowed 
to take such actions as was necessary to prevent the decisions taking 
practical effect. Any action was to be decisive and was to indicate 
that the whites declined to be a pawn in the game of Indian politics. 
In internal politics they said that they refused to be over-ridden 
by home ignorance and indifference. 
The Wood-Winterton proposal was an attempt to solve the Indian 
question. It proposed a common electoral roll for all British subjects 
possessing certain prescribed qualification, either property or educa-
tion, which would result in the franchisement of approximately ten 
percent of the Indian population. This proposal provided for the 
official majority in the Legislative Council. Indians were to have 
one-half as many seats as the Europeans and were to have adequate re-
presentation. They were to be considered equally with the Europeans 
in deciding fitness for membership on the Executive Council. No 
changes were to be made in the Highlands and immigration regulations, 
but segregation was to be abolished. 
The Indian government accepted the proposals, but the Europeans 
objected strongly, because the plan did not provide safequards against 
ultimate Indian predominance over the Europeans. The proposal was a 
compromise, but the Europeans were determined not to compromise. They 
rejected the proposal, and a rebellion appeared inevitable. The set-
tlers prepared a plan to seize control of the government by force. 8 
The governor was to be kidnapped and taken to a lonely farm sixty 
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miles from Nairobi; there were to be surprise raids to take over the 
railway, post and telegraphic systems; and messages were to be broad-
cast stating the settlers case and appealing to the British Dominion 
republics for support. This plan of a unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence in colonial Kenya and enforcement of minority rule by a few 
thousand Europeans could have succeeded, but the settlers hesitated 
due to loyalty to the crown and constitutional government. 
The British government, alarmed by the threatened settler revolt, 
invited the disputing parties to London under the chairmanship of the 
Duke of Devonshire. The Africans, the third but so far neglected 
party to the dispute, were represented by the Reverend J. W. Arthur, 
a church of Scotland missionary, while Lord Dalamere headed the European 
delegation. It is interesting to note that the governor sided with 
the Europeans almost throughout the discussions. The Indians had to 
depend on the Government of India for their support. 9 
The conference lasted three months and resulted in the famous 
white paper of 1923. It was a compromise, and the British layed down 
a policy which was to be followed for the next thirty years. The re-
port stated that: 
"Primarily Kenya is an African territory and His Majesty's 
government thinks is necessary definitely to record their consi~red 
opinion that the interests of the African natives must be para-
mount and that if and when, those interests and the interests of 
the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail. 
Obviously the interests of the other communities, European, 
Indian and Arab, must severally be safeguarded. Whatever the 
circumstances in which members of these communities have entered 
Kenya, there will be no drastic action or reversal of measures 
already introduced, such as may have be~n contemplated in some 
quarters, the result of which might be to destroy or impair the 
existing interests of those who have already settled in Kenya. 
But in the Administration of Kenya, his Majesty's government 
regards themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the 
African population, and they are unable to delegate or share this 
trust, the object of which may be aefined as the protection and 
advancement of the native races. 11 l 
The white paper dealt specifically with the controversy between 
the European and Asian communities. It decided that the official ma-
jority in the legislative council was to be maintained; there were to 
be eleven European, five Indians, one Arab members; and one nominated 
unofficial member was to represent African interest. The composition 
of the Governor's Executive Council was to be left unchanged except 
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for the addition of a nominated unofficial member to represent African 
interests. Reservation of the Highlands was to be maintained for 
Europeans but outside the area racial segregation as between Indians 
and Europeans would be abolished. It was accepted that corrmercial seg-
regation should be discontinued, and since medical authorities believed 
that residential segregation was not absolutely essential for heathful 
conditions, separation of races by legislative enactment was held to 
be unjustifiable. Segregation in townships was to be abolished as far 
as the Indians and Europeans were concerned, but was maintained for 
the natives. 11 On immigration the white paper stated that only in 
extreme circumstances could His Majesty's Government contemplate legis-
lation designed to exclude from a British colony immigrants from any 
other part of the British Empire. Such racial discrimination in im-
migration was not in accord with the policy, and the government would 
not tolerate introduction of any such legislation in Kenya. 
The first reactions of the settlers to the Devonshire white paper 
were hostile. 12 They criticized the settlement because it did not 
maintain residential· segregation, because it ruled out self-government 
until such time as the natives should be ready for it, and because it 
did not secure the Highlands any more effectively. The European 
delegation, however, accepted the solution. They appreciated the fact 
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that the fundamental constitutional principles on which the Europeans 
had been standing were confirmed. They expressed regret, however, that 
segregation was not maintained and that Indian representation in the 
Legislative Council was porportionately large. 
The Indians were dissatisfied with the settlement. They considered 
it a "gross betrayal 11 • 13 The delegation from India rejected the set-
tlement. They saw only one gain, that for the native. The Indian's 
delegation to the Imperial Conference of 1923 said that it believed 
that the discrimination was due to race and color. They suggested that 
the dominion representatives and the British government should agree 
to appoint a committee to give effect to the 1921 resolution. 
The natives who were in a position to understand politics had 
watched the course of events in the Indian controversy and had received 
the white paper with delight. The white paper made the Europeans and 
Indians aware of the plight of the native community. Neither the 
Europeans nor the Indians had shown any real desire to protect the 
native. The principle of 11 paramountcy 11 was established as a measure 
of expediecy and little attention to it was paid in practice. The white 
paper taken on its face value would mean that the interests of both 
European and Indians had been pushed to the background in the interests 
of the natives. What was important to the settlers was that the 
colony would continue to develop along the usual lines and that would 
give them the chance to continue to dominate without Indian interference. 
The statement was only the means to and end. The real objective was 
the establishment of some basis, other than racial prejudice, on which 
the Indian would be kept from equal participation in the development 
of a crown policy. 
The settlers in 1923 statement of paramouncy to mean separate 
developments for the natives and non-natives, in what is known as the 
11 dual policy 11 • The 11 dual policy 11 came into use after the 1923 white 
paper. Its aim was the complementary development of the two co!TD'Tiun-
itites, in which the native would develop both areas. The policy was 
adapted by the settlers as a solution for the difficulty created by 
the fact that, in their zeal to defeat the Indians, they had over-
reached themselves and secured the statement that native rights were 
paramount. This, if fulfilled, would have proven embarrasing to the 
settlers. As usual they tried to get their own way. The dual policy 
proved to be the means to avoid the effects of paramountcy. The doc-
trine of paramouncy was invented to secure the Europeans against the 
Indians, the doctrine of dual policy was to secure them against the 
t . 14 na ive. 
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The dual policy was accepted by the Parliamentary Commission of 
1924 and was clearly stated by the government of Kenya before the im-
perial authorities issued the white paper of 1927. This paper was the 
result of the settlers seeking to change the 1923 white paper. They 
presented the colonial office with the following: The permanency of 
European settlement in Kenya was recognized and therefore altered the 
1923 statement that Kenya was primarily an African Country; it provided 
for the association of the immigrant communitites in trusteeship where 
as the original paper had specifically denied them any part and had re-
served the execution of the trust to agents of the imperial government. 
This contradicts the policy which the African was suppose to be para-
mount and changed it back to white supremacy as it had been. 
The British government on the debates of the 1927 white paper 
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assured the members of both houses that responsibility remained, as be-
fore, with them. The association was explained as bringing the Euror:eans 
a clear understanding of administrative problems. Since the Europeans 
would eventually control the country, this was essential. This gave 
the settlers what they wanted, eventual self-government. The govern-
ment did not want a repitition of the experience in South Africa, 
where determination to retain full imperial responsibility had created 
a feeling that the white had no responsibility for the black. Nothing 
in the statement would affect the rights of the British Indians in 
15 Kenya. 
Some mistrusted the shift in policy for it indicated that the 
imperial government accepted self-government as the ultimate aim and 
conceded that eventually they could not maintain control to protect 
the natives. They expected the natives to adapt themselves to machinery 
designed for the whites. The policy inaugurated according to the 1927 
paper subordinated both native and Indian interest to those of the 
Europeans, regardless of trust obligations. This marked the deteri-
oration of British conceptions of fair play to native populations and 
showed an interesting example of dominion influence in imperial policy. 
A third and the last of the white papers was issued in 1930. 
This paper agreed with the 1923 paper on native policy and with the 
terms of the mandate for Tanganyika. 
They fully accepted the principle that the relation of His 
Majesty's Government to the native populations of East Africa 
is one of trusteeship which cannot be developed, and from which 
they cannot be relieved. The ultimate responsibility for the ex-
ercise of this trusteeship must accordingly rest with them 
alone ••• that the interests of the African natives must be 
paramount and that if and when, those interests and the interest 
of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should pre-
vail. 
1 Paramountcy 1 was interpreted to mean: 
" ••• that the creation and preservation of a field for 
the full development of native life is a first charge on any 
territory and that the government having created this field in 
the establishment of an organized governmental administration 
of the modern type has the duty to devote its energies to as-
sisting the natives to ~gke the best possible use of the oppor-
tunities open to them". 
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The European settlers opposed the 1930 white paper. They objected 
to the lack of regard for the white community in the memorandum on 
native policy and held that a constitution based on 11 paramountcy 11 would 
nullify their plans for a dominion of East Africa, "developing on char-
acteristically and distint British lines. They contended that the 
papers indicated a reversal of policy which was inimical to white set-
tlement, and in disregarding the interest of a section of the popula-
tion, they could not be permanent. They were to "insist that ultimately 
we are British citizens in this country, and because we are British 
citizens we accept the responsibilities and claim the privileges of 
British citizens, because we are on the spot, we mean ultimately to 
control the destiny of Africa. 1117 
When the paper was tested in 1932 with the discovery of gold in 
the western part of the country, the policy was quickly changed by the 
governor in the interests of the immigrant minority. Margery Perham 
(the author of "Rice and Politics in Kenya'') thought that the British 
Government was right in the 1930 policy and that it should be exer-
cised firmly "no more surrenders, no more constitutional privileges 
for the settlers 11 • 18 It is only fair to conclude that if the govern-
ment had practiced the policy of helping the native and let him share 
in the responsibility of government, then the violent reaction by 
Africans, which will be examined next, probably would not have occurred. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE AFRICAN REACTION TO DISCRIMINATION 
Colonel Meinertzhagen, a captain in the Kings African Rifles 
who arrived in Kenya in 1902, write in his diary the following note 
about Sir Charles Eliot: 
He amazed me with his views on the future of East Africa. 
He envisaged a thriving colony of thousands of Europeans. He 
intends to confine the natives to reserves and use them as cheap 
labor on farms. I suggested that the country belonged to Africans, 
that their interests must prevail over the interests of strangers. 
He would not have it; he kept using the word 'paramount' with 
reference to the claims of Europeans. I said that some day the 
Africans would be educated and armed; that would lead to a clash. 
Eliot thought that day was so far di~tant as not to matter --
but I am convinced that in the end the Africans will win and 
that Eliot's policy can lead only to trouble and disappointmentgl 
What is surprising is not that Eliot, who was supposed to be a 
scholarly intellectual, could not see beyond the imperialistic urge, 
but that a young captain, twenty-four years old, could. At the end of 
his. service in 1904 in Kenya, the young officer again could see further 
ahead than Eliot: 
I am sorry to leave the Kikuyu -- they are the most intel-
1 igent of the African tribes I have met; therefore they will be 
the most progressive under European guidance and will be more 
susceptible to subversive activites. They will be one of the 
first tribes to demand freedom from European influence and in the 
end cause a lot of trouble.2 
Before the end of the half-century the young captain had proven 
himself right. After the first clash with the British when imperial 
rule was being introduce, the Africans remained silent and watched the 
British rule. It was not until 1921 that the Africans began to organize 
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themselves in order to show their objections to racial discrimination. 
This African awakening was caused by the strict enforcement of the 
registration ordinance known as 11 Kipande law 11 , the doubling of Hut and 
Poll Tax from five to ten rupees, and the decision of the convention 
to cut farm wages. Harry Thuku, a young missionary-trained African pro-
vided the spark which led to the Nairobi Riot. Harry Thuku had founded 
the young Kikuyu Association in 1921 as a union for the growing number 
of Kikuyu workers in Nairobi. He was Kenya's first militant trade 
union leader and his anti-government and anti-European speeches were 
used to increase membership of the association and also to advance his 
political ambitions. His main platform was the fact that the natives 
had helped in the British war effort only to get an increase of taxes, 
wage-cuts, and a pass law as a reward. He suggested that the natives 
hire lorries to collect all the Kipandes' certificates and dump them 
in the Governor's residence. This was too much for the government which 
did not expect the Africans to react. Thuku was arrested in 1922. 
There was a general strike the following day amoung the African workers 
in Nairobi. Picketing was well organized, and a large crowd followed 
Thuku's supporters to the police lines where the guards had been re-
inforced by a detachment of the King's African Rifles. There were 
inflall1Jlatory speeches but the crowd remained good tempered and the 
whole affair could have been resolved peacefully if a nervous African 
policeman had not fired at the crowd. Other shots were fired before 
the crowd dispersed. Twenty-five people were killed. 3 The organizers 
of the strike were arrested, .and Thuku was exiled to a distant pro-
vince. So ended the first organized attempt by the Kenyan Africans 
to express their views on government policies. 
By 1920 the reaction to the European rule by Africans was 
heightened by two factors. For one thing, by this time the Africans 
who had been educated by missionaries and who had accepted Western 
culture suddenly became aware of the aflictions of their brothers. 
They became the greatest critics of the colonial government and of 
Western values. The other factor was the aftermath of World War I. 
Most of the Africans who had served as carriers or regular military 
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men had discovered that the white men were human and that they were very 
brave when force was intact and learned the importance of organized 
resistance. Between 1920 and 1930, organized associations led by men 
who had served in the war appeared. 4 
From the time of the White Paper of 1923 to the outbreak of the 
Mau Mau Revolution in 1952, Kenya was strictly developed on racial lines. 
Land problems were the major cause for the rebellion. Besides the land 
problem was the color-bar, suppresion of black Kenyans physically, edu-
cationally, politically, socially, and economically. Supression led 
to frustration and finally to the outbreak of violence, which helped 
to rouse the white man from his long dream. 
By 1926 land in the Kikuyu area, which had the largest population 
of any tribe in Kenya, was crowded. The population density in Kiambu, 
for example, was about 400 to a square mile, in central Nyanza about 
165, and in Bunyore it had already gone over 1,000. On the other hand, 
the average white settler enjoyed more than 500 acreas of land in 1925, 
and in the white highlands only 9 percent of the occupied land was under 
cultivation. The crisis over land policy was further heightened by the 
discovery of gold in western Kenya which was in the African reserves. 
The Native Land Trust Ordinance of 1930 was hurriedly amended in 1932 
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to exclude from the reserves the land containing minerals. This aroused 
a sense of insecurity among the Africans, and it also showed them the 
futility of placing faith in legislation which could easily be altered 
by a body which they were not represented. In 1933 the Kenyan land 
commission was set up under the chairmanship of Sir Morris Carter to 
inquire into rights of natives and to define the African and European 
settled areas. The Africans did not accept the report although the 
British government accepted it. 5 
On the question of color-bar and suppression of Africans in vari-
ous ways, the years from the 1930s through 1952 saw greater effort by 
the Africans to change things. Apart from the schools established by 
missionaries, the Africans did not get any direct help from the govern-
ment to educate their children. The government's aim in 1938 was to 
provide good general education for the European children between the 
ages of six and sixteen who attended private schools. The aim of Indian 
education was to provide an eight years' course of primary education 
for children of six and over. The aim of the African education was to 
raise the standard alike of character and efficiency of the bulk of the 
people. It produced clerks and junior officials for the administration. 
By 1938 it is estimated that only about 12 percent of the African child-
ren of school age were receiving any education at all. There was no 
African in senior high school or college. The funds to pay for edu-
cation in the case of Africans again was met by the people themselves. 
The African Local Native Councils levied special education rates to 
run the elementary schools. Statistics show that the government was 
spending sixty-four cents per head for the African children in 1932 
and forty-four cents in 1936. On the other hand, they were spending 
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852 shillings on the European child in 1929 and 800 shillings in 1932. 
It is interesting to note that much of the money spent by the govern-
ment came fron the African Hut and Poll Tax, while the rest came from 
customs import duties. In towns and cities discrimination was the 
order of the day. Residential areas, hotels, and restaurants were all 
segregated. Liquor laws made it illegal to sell or serve an African 
European liquor. 
In industry Africans were paid low wages based on the basic minimum 
necessities for one individual. The civil service reflected the social 
structure of the country in its three racil categories of employment 
with different rates of pay for each race, even if they were doing the 
same job. 6 Economically, the African could not compete with a European 
or Asian because in agriculture he was barred from growing cash crops 
such as tea, coffee, sisal, and pyrethrum. In towns he could not afford 
to go into business for the banks would not loan him money. Politically, 
the African, between 1922 when the first African political parties 
appeared and 1952, was restricted to tribal or local politics. The white 
settlers feared that if Africans joined together, there would be no 
place for them as a minority race. The Local Native Councils were con-
ducted on tribal lines in a policy of divide and rule. 
At the outbreak of the Mau Mau rebellion, in 1952 the European 
settlers in Kenya were thinking of asking the British for self-govern-
ment. It seems as if they were unaware of what was going on in the 
African side. In 1949-1950 most settlers did not think that Africans 
would think of independence. 7 However, the European civil servants' 
association which had worked closely with the African civil servants' 
had noticed restlessness. They had tried to inform the government to 
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make some changes but then, was met with the reply to the Africans 
that the European civil service association was only trying to prevent 
Africans from getting higher jobs.8 
In politics the Africans were becoming more concious of a potential 
revolution. The Associations of the 1920s did not survive but were 
soon replaced by Kikuyu Central Association founded in 1924. The main 
aim was to obtain redress for specific grievances. 9 By the 1940s 
these associations had grown in strength because more educated Africans 
joined them. 10 In 1944 the Kenya African Union was founded by Africans 
all over Kenya who could not be confined to local politics any longer. 
This was to show to the world that national politics had arrived. The 
leadership of KAU was taken over by Jomo Kenyatta who had just re-
turned from England. KAU published a Swahili paper called Sauti 1.2... 
Mwafrica (the African voice). The paper, together with numerous 
vernacular papers, pleaded the cause of Kenya Africans. They pleaded 
for changed in the land policy. They also wanted fair wages, in-
creased political representation, an end to discrimination. Indepen-
dent schools and churches also flourished during this period. That 
trend demonstrated that the African was not only becoming politically 
aware of the evils of Europeans rule but was doing something to overcome 
some of the handicap that faced him. 
While the KAU was trying to recruit members throughout the country 
and to negotiate with government authorities, KCA was moving more to-
wards radicalism. They employed a highly selective and secret system 
of recruiting members. They began an underground movement. They be-
gan with the dominant Kikuyu tribe and hoped to expand to the other 
tribes. Their aim was to use revolutionary means if the constitutional 
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one represented by KAU failed. It was in one of the secret recruitment 
that the famous Navaisha arrest and trial resulted. Nineteen Africans 
were tried in 1950 accused of secret oath taking. 11 KCA was banned, 
but the secret oath taking went on; finally many Africans became so 
frustrated that the Mau Mau rebellion broke out in 1952. 
When the Mau Mau Rebellion broke out a state of emergency was 
declared on October 20, 1952. The rebellion shocked the white settlers 
who did not dream of an independent Kenya in their life times or even 
that of their children. The government immediately reacted against 
the leaders of KAU and imprisoned them. Jomo Kenyatta was thought to 
be the leader of the Mau Mau. 12 Despite his repeated denials of 
knowing anything about Mau Mau, most settlers and Europeans thought 
otherwise. 13 Jomo Kenyatta and KAU being linked with Mau Mau served 
to show the attitute and prejudice of different writers -- Majdalaney 
and MacPhee on the European side and Mboya, Kenyatta, Barnett, and 
Njama who wrote from the African point of view. 14 
Another controversial move by the government followed the declara-
tion of the state of emergency and the arrest of the African leaders. 
White leaders decided to bring Jomo Kenyatta and a few others to trial 
at Kapenguria. The intention of the government was to use the trial 
as propaganda to discredit the Kikuyu leaders and reduce them to 
the level of criminals. The government had a hard time in proving any-
thing against Kenyatta since he had done nothing wrong. 15 
When the state of emergency was declared in Kenya, Western re-
porters rushed to the scene and reported things which they little under-
stood. Time reported16 that, in recent years, the black 96 percent of 
Kenya's population had banded together in a dozen fanatic, anti-white 
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secret societies run by witch dotors and pledged to the slogan "Africa 
for the Africans". One called itself the "Men of God" another was the 
"Spirits of the Dead", led by a soccer player named Elijah, who used 
his soccer medals to persuade the tribesmen that he was devine. The 
Mau Mau was the most feared and successful of them all. From their 
jungle headquarters, Mau Mau raiders burned the huts of tribesmen who 
went to work for the white farmers at 7 cents a day, murdered white 
farmers with knobkerries and assagais and sniped at British officials. 
In spite of the effort by the British to control Mau Mau, the society 
grew at a pace which suggests professional organization and funds 
from abroad. The paper also accuses Kenyatta of being leader of Mau 
Mau. The time of emergency shows that the Westerner could not believe 
an African had the capacity to organize anything. Some writers looked 
at Mau Mau as a growing band of Africans who aimed by terroism to 
drive the British from Kenya's fertile white highlands. Some Wes-
terners17 looked at Mau Mau more differently. They saw the land pro-
blem, the political and educational suppression, and the danger of 
the white dream in Kenya. The monopolization of the best land and 
cheap labor in Kenya were the economic pillars on which white supremacy 
rested and white supremacists tried to block any advance or independent 
development of the Africans. The government reacted to the revolution 
by taking several emergency measures to enforce law and order but 
had no conception of the necessity for instituting reforms which would 
ease the discontent of the Africans. 18 
White Europeans pictured Kenyatta as a communist and a leader of 
Mau Mau, 19 but an American visiting Kenya in 1952 observed things dif-
ferently from the British. 20 He thought that Kenyatta was doing a good 
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job in providing African education and that the peoples' sacrifices 
in contributing to the ~ost and their hunger for education was not false. 
The British believed he was a false prophet who exploited the people. 
The declaration of the state of emergency caused more problems 
than it solved. Some people viewed the declaration as the right step 
taken by the governmor to suppress Mau Mau, but others believed that 
there was no emergency and that the declaration itself was the im-
mediate cause of the Mau Mau revolt. The government had declared a 
state of emergency and had made all the necessary preparations. Of-
ficials ordered a battalion of Lancashire Fusilesa airlifted from the 
Suez Canal to Nairobi to maintain law and order, but they had no enemy 
to fight. One year passed before anything of significance occurred. 
The settlers reacted to the emergency by evacuating the Kikuyu squatters 
and sent them back to the already overcrowded reserve. The unemployed 
from Nairobi were also sent back. The men found themselves idle and 
soon began to drift to the forests of Kenya and Abendares. They or-
ganized themselves and then began their attack on the white settlers 
and loyal Africans whom they saw as traitors. 
The way the Mau Mau chose to fight made it difficult for the 
British to suppress the rebellions. It was hard to tell who was a 
Mau Mau and who was not, and the British were worried about what mea-
sures to take for fear of turning moderates into Mau Mau. They were 
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afraid of turning the situation into a black-white struggle. After 
three years of fighting the Mau Mau, the British could not contain 
the rebellion and decided to change commanders. Commander Sir George 
Erskine, who believed that bullets alone could not contain the Kikuyu, 
took over from Major General Gerald Wilathbury. 23 Meawhile, the gov-
ernment arrested most of the Kikuyus and anyone suspected of being 
or of helping the Mau Mau. The idea behind this was not to cut off 
the source of food and recruitment for the Mau Mau. The new com-
mander decided on an offensive rather than defensive approach to end 
the Mau Mau War. 24 
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While the Mau Mau War was going on in the forests, farms and around 
Nairobi, African leaders who were not detained were pressing for con-
stitutional changes. After the KAU had been banned in 1953, the 
Kenya Federation of Labor took its place. It was the only body which 
could speak for the Africans. The federation under the leadership of 
Tom Mboya became a political movement instead of a labor movement 
which it was meant to be. The government in 1956 threatened to pro-
scribe the K.F.L. if it did not stop its political activities. 25 
The Mau Mau shock had played an important part in creating the 
right atmosphere in that now the Imperial Power was willing to talk 
with the African leaders. In the course of these dialogues, power 
shifted from the Europeans to the Africans. The first African minister, 
B. A. Ohanga, was appointed in 1954. And in the 1960 Constitution, 
the majority of ministers were Africans. It is not to be taken for 
granted, however, that after 1952 everything became easy for the 
African. After 1952 many Africans started to fight for their rights 
either in the Mau Mau or peacefully with consitutional means. With 
the political leaders of the African detained and with the emergency 
continuing, the Africans had to find a way of continuing the struggle. 
Bitter constitutional battles were fought in Kenya and London. And 
the fact that by 1960 the Africans were victorious spoke for the ded-
ication and tactics of their leaders during those eight difficult years. 
The African political parties which had been prohibited since 
1953 were again allowed in mid-1955 all but in the Central Province. 
These parties could only be formed on a district level, with a view 
of joining such dustrict organizations to form bigger organizations 
later. This policy was challenged by Argwings-Kodhedk, the first 
African lawyer in Kenya. He formed a body called the Keny African 
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National Congress which declared that the government's policy of 
limiting political parties to districts would encourage tribal develop-
ment. Because districts were based on tribes, the government's action 
26 
would also prevent the development of any national sense. 
Some of the European settlers in Kenya, such as Michael Blundell, 
realized that the Mau Mau War could not by won by bullets. Blundell 
started to work towards a multi-racial government. To the other 40,000 
whites, this amounted to appeasement of the "coolies" (Asians) and 
"monkeys" (Africans), and they blamed the nigger loving anex of the 
London School of Economics, on which the colonial office depended for 
advise. 27 Blundell in seeking votes for his multi-racial policy, won 
because he was respected by the other farmers and because the settlers 
understood in private that the only alternative to multi-racial policy 
of Blundell was a perpetual race war. Blundell was progressive. 
He expected the white minority to continue running the government but 
with a concern for and an assistance from the Africans and Asians. The 
settlers were united politically behind Blundell before the Mau Mau. 
They wanted to get Kenya from the British as a self-governing domin-
ion.28 The Mau Mau revolution ended that talk~ The white settlers' 
politics divided into those who favored multi-racial government and 
those who favored a policy close to apartheid of South Africa. This 
arose because the settlers had not accepted the fact that Kenya was 
going to be an African country. 
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The British government, in developing a workable constitution in 
Kenya, tended to follow Blundell's multi-racial policy. The Lyttelton 
Constitution of 1954 brought the first six African members into the 
Legislative Council and under the Lennox-Boyd Constitution plan the 
first African election was held on a limited franchise. The election 
gave the African a second ministry. The Africans accepted the in-
creased seats but rejected the ministerial posts. Multi-racialism was 
totally unacceptable to the Africans because accepting it meant accepting 
the injustices of the past. They wanted the government to give a de-
cent life for their people. This meant land redistribution, expansion 
of African education, and making available job opportunities for 
Africans. In short, the African leaders demanded that their people be 
given a chance to attain equality. The achieve this, non-racial 
rather than multi-racial policies were necessary. 
Blundell tried to sell his multi-racial policy again in 1959 and 
he was supported by the Kenya government. He resigned as minister for 
agriculture to lead a new multi-racial pressure group -- the New 
Kenya Group. His aim was to end all racial barriers, including land 
barriers. He was supported at first by speically elected Africans 
and Asians but soon gained adherents from the moderates of the African 
elected members. Blundell encouraged by this success formed a multi-
racial party called the Kenya National Party. It appeared that the 
multi-racial was at last succeeding, but some far-sighted Africans 
refused to go along with it. They formed the Kenya Independence 
Movement. 29 They declared that the membership of their movement would 
consist only of Africans. The battle between African nationalism and 
the settlers' demands had begun. The Africans, however, scored their 
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first victory in 1960 when the Macleod Constitution granted them a 
majority of ministers, with the Europeans second and the Asians third. 30 
The settlers were up in arms. They condemned Blundell and other 
Europeans with similar views as traitors. They regarded this settle-
ment as a major betrayal. 
The election of 1961 brought an African majority to the legisla-
ture for the first time. There were thirty-three Africans, ten 
Europeans, eight Asians, and two Arabs. The white settlers believed 
they had been betrayed. They feared that Africans might seize their 
t ft . d d 34 Th f f th bl k t k" th proper y a er in epen ence. e ear o e ac s a ing over e 
settlers' land for free and the Kikuyu whom they mistrusted becoming 
the possible rulers generated rumors that the Mau Mau were back. 32 
The Macleod Constitution did not put an end to the conflict between 
the Africans and settlers. The settlers gathered under their old 
leaders of the 30s and 40s. They formed the Kenya Coalition in what 
proved to be a last-ditch, rearguard action. The settlers also tried 
to interfere with the African parties. The African elected members 
formed the Uhuru Party but later changed it to Kenya African National 
Union. The whites pointed out that the party would be dominated by the 
Kikuyu and that the minority tribes would suffer after independence. 
The split led to the formation of the Kenya African Democratic Union. 
It was found that Blundell and his Kenya Party were behind KADU's argu-
ment and later joined to form the minority government between Arpil, 
1961 and April, 1962. 33 The coalition between KADU and the Kenya 
Party in forming the cabinet was seen as a victory for the British 
fragmatism and Sir Patrick's desire to curb Mboya's influence and to 
rule the country through stooges. 34 With the parties divided and 
KANU agitating for release of Kenyatta, it seemed that civil war was 
. t 35 em1nen • In August, 1962 Kenyatta was released and became the 
leader of KANU. Conflict of the two parties was resolved in the last 
Lancaster House Constitutional Conference of 1962. Mr. Maulding, 
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the Colonial Secretary, imposed a compromise. There was to be a strong 
central government but with federal provisions for regional govern-
ments. With the most complicated constitution in the world, Kenya 
became independent in December of 1963. 
There is no doubt that the achievement of independence in Kenya was 
a real struggle. From the formation of the colony to the day of inde-
pendence, the African was faced with racial obstruction. The acquiring 
of land by the white settler began the struggle. The white man chose 
to ignore native rights from the outset. In the development of the 
country, too, the white man chose to be the supreme ruler and made sure 
that the African or Asian was nowhere close to challenge him. The in-
troduction of color-bar, different educationl programs, restrictions 
on cash crops, and political suppression all were done to perpetuate 
the dream of white supremacy. This in turn led to the Mau Mau rebel-
lion which magnified by frightened white settlers. The outbreak of 
the revolution was in itself a shock to the settlers who believed that 
they had been kind to their workers. They did not understand the love 
of the African of the same land which they owned. Other Europeans 
outside Kenya were quick to realized that the revolution would be 
ended by ma~ing constitutional changes. The brutality of the British 
in dealing with the emergency was another way of showing that they 
cared to protect the settlers and not the Africans. 
The revolution was a turning point in the African struggle for 
independence. It made it possible for the Africans to talk with the 
British government, and this led to reform in the land problem and 
other areas of grievances. The constitutional battle after the out-
break of the revolution was severe. 
The Africans had to see beyond the offers which were meant to 
trap them in their struggle to be their own masters. This goes to 
prove to those who thought that the Africans were not ready for inde-
pendence were wrong. African leaders were able men who did not want 
to see injustice done to their people and who also wanted equality 
with all the races. The government that was established by Africans 
was a government by all not on a racial basis. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The introduction of white settlement in Kenya was the introduction 
of racial discrimination. White settlement was the factor which made 
the Kenya colony different from the other colonies in colonial empire. 
Without European settlement Kenya's history would have been more like 
that of Uganda or Nigeria. The difference between Kenya and Nigeria, 
Uganda, and Tanganyika which had little racial discrimination is that 
there were no white settlers or Indians to complicate matters. Nigeria 
was developed as an African country by the British government. Sir 
Donald Cammeron built a successful system of local native government in 
Tangayika. He made the fullest use of the tribal institutions that 
had survived the war. To replace the authoritariarism of his predeces-
sors, both British and German, he restored democratic constitutions 
which made the tribal opinion supreme over the chiefs. He was trans-
ferred to Nigeria where he helped with the same kind of development. 
In these countries the native was being prepared by British officials 
for eventual self-government. In Rhodesia, however, the story was 
as that of Kenya in that white settlement existed. In both Rhodesia 
and Kenya racial discrimination was present. The 1923 Constitution in 
Rhodesia allowed Africans to own land anywhere, but this was soon 
changed. It was made illegal for the African to own land in well-
watered areas and in mining country. The parts left for African occu-
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pation were arid, rocky, and almost devoid of roads. Kenya's policy 
of native 11 paramountcy11 was replaced early in the colonial period by 
that of the white paramountcy. By inviting South Africa farmers and 
by molding their policies after those of South Africa, the Kenya 
settlers managed to maintain racial discrimination for more than fifty 
years. The Kenya settlers came from the influencial and ruling class 
of England. They were not from the lower classes, and they were set-
tled in Kenya and endowed with privileges. British policy in Kenya 
was not always adhered to because it was blinded by the settlers' own 
policy interests. South African policy was similar to that of Kenya 
and white settlers they asked for South African support and interven-
tion more than once. 
The acuteness of racial discrimination lay in the existence of a 
settled British population in the midst of a larger native population. 
These settlers were a land owning aristrocracy, supported by the British 
government in their position of ascendancy and superiority. Thus race 
and empire prompted the imperial government, regardless of attempts to 
secure justice between all races within Kenya, consistently to favor 
British residents •. The Indians and Africans were citizens of British 
Empire, but they were not Biritsh. Since the white settlers were a min-
ority and since they could only maintain their position with govern-
ment support, their artificial position was bound to fall -- as it did 
eventually -- because the native refused to let them continue that way. 
The imperial policy did not work in Kenya because the settlers 
were always opposed to it, and the settlers were aided by the governor 
and by other government officials who were suppose to be protecting 
the rights of the natives. Committees and proposals of individuals, 
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as well as of the government of India, pointed to the need for the 
establishment of the Royal Corrmission to study the operation of East 
Africa but such action did not result in any changes. The policy of 
11 paramountcy 11 was adopted in 1923, but as far as practice was concerne:l, 
no change had taken place. 11 Paramountcy 11 was a compromise between 
Indian and European conflicts just as the 11 dual policy 11 was a compro-
mise between African and European in order that white supremacists 
could continue to dominate the country. 
The 11 paramountcy 11 of 1923 safeguarded African interests. Without 
the Indian question and its solution, Kenya might have followed Southern 
Rhodesian and became a self-governing colony ruled by a white minority 
or might have become another South Africa. The Africans later used the 
policy to gain political concessions which the Europeans never intended 
to give~ 
Churchill in his visit to Kenya in 1907 had seen the future clearly, 
that there was room for the "white race, the brown race, and the dark 
race". Kenya today is exactly that. It is the conclusion of this paper 
that while the British proclaimed an imperial trusteeship, she also 
helped institute racial discrimination in the name of protecting British 
citizens. Britain did carry out the full duty of supervising her pro-
claimed policy. The settler policy was short-sighted, and it caused 
a battle between the races in Kenya. The result of the struggle was in-
evitable; the Africans fought for and won equal rights. 
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